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The essential rationale for imposing the doctrine of strict liability in tort is that such imposition affords the consuming public
the maximum protection from dangerous defects in manufactured
products by requiring the manufacturer to bear the burden of injuries and losses enhanced by such defects in its products!

In Brandenburger v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. ,2 the
Montana Supreme Court adopted the doctrine of strict liability
without fault to govern actions for injuries caused by defective products.3 While the court recognized that this was a "major change in
Montana's tort law by way of judicial decision," 4 it found that the
"trend seems to be to adopt the theory of strict liability and it has
now been adopted by a majority of the states." 5
Indeed, adoption by the American Law Institute of the theory
of strict liability, embodied in section 402A of the Restatement
(Second), 8 and the simultaneous expression of the policies underlying section 402A by Justice Traynor in Greenman v. Yuba Power
Products, Inc., 7 were instrumental in forging "the most rapid and
1. Brandenburger v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 162 Mont. 506, 517, 513 P.2d 268,
275 (1973).
2. Id. at 506, 513 P.2d at 268 (1973).
3. Products liability is the name given currently to the liability of a manufacturer,
seller, or other supplier for harm caused by an unreasonably dangerous product. See generally
J. HENDERSON & R. PEARSON, THE TORTS PROCESS 546 (1975); W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF TORTS 641 (4th ed. 1971).
4. Brandenburger v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 162 Mont. 506, 515, 513 P.2d 268,
273 (1973).
5. Id. at 513, 513 P.2d at 272.
6. R.Es'fATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
7. 59 Cal.2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962).

1977]

PRODUCTS LIABILITY

223

altogether spectacular overturn of an established rule in the entire
history of the law of torts." 8 By 1971, two years before Brandenburger, Dean Prosser was able to state that "the simple ground of
'strict liability in tort' is accepted and applied by some two-thirds
of the courts." 9
The overwhelming number of courts adopting some form of
strict liability in tort has made that doctrine now the paramount
ground for recovery in product injury cases, but this rapid development has also produced considerable confusion and what one commentator has called a "crisis of confidence" 10 within the legal profession. That "crisis" results from conflicts between the relatively restrictive language of section 402A and judicial efforts to expand the
scope of liability by returning to, and reasoning from, the core concepts expressed in Greenman. Lawyers can no longer predict with
any certainty the range of results in cases requiring an appeal because, while courts have verbalized their decisions in the language
of section 402A, they have relied most heavily on the sometimes
conflicting philosophies underlying strict liability in reaching those
decisions. 11
The professional confusion accompanying this crisis of confidence originates in three sources: first, the historical development
of three distinct, but intertwining and overlapping, theoriesnegligence, warranty and strict liability in tort-under which, alone
or in combination, 12 products liability may be imposed; second,
frequent failure to distinguish factually between products which
are unreasonably dangerous because of hidden flaws in the manufacturing process and those which are unreasonably dangerous
because of the way in which they are designed and marketed; 13 and
third, failure to treat in a distinct way legally such different classes
of products. 14
8. Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. R.Ev.
791, 793-94 (1966).
9. W. PROSSER, supra note 3, § .98, at 657-58. Indeed, today section 402A "is the law for
strict liability for products in virtually all jurisdictions in the United States." Kiely, The Art
of the Neglected Obvious in Products Liability Cases: Some Thoughts on Llewellyn's "The
Common Law Tradition," 24 DEPAUL L. R.Ev. 914, 915 n.6 (1975).
10. Kiely, supra note 9, at 916-20, 946-48.
11. Although the language of section 402A was an appropriate verbalization of the idea
of strict liability when drafted, it collides directly now with judicial desire to expand the scope
of liability. See generally Kiely, supra note 9, at 927-28. Examples of this collision are discussed more fully in part II of this article. See pp. 248-53 infra.
12. These distinct theories will be discussed more extensively in part II of this article. ·
See pp. 232-74 infra.
13. J. HENDERSON & R. PEARSON, supra note 3, at 546.
14. A recurring theme of this article is that courts continue to use negligence terminology and concepts when dealing with strict liability. See, e.g., pp. 233-34, 236-38, 271-74 infra.
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Because thti Montana Supreme Court relatively recently
adopted section 402A's theory of strict liability, Montana lawyers
and judges have had little exposure to section 402A products litigation. But this paucity of litigation may be fortunate in that the
profession may escape the confusion attendant to such litigation in
other States 15 if the supreme court can clarify the direction which
products liability is to take in this State. This article seeks to serve
the needs of the Montana bench and bar by addressing the issues
likely to be raised in products liability litigation. It will describe the
history of products liability nationally and in Montana and will
analyze major issues by examining current directions in case law.
Finally, it will offer a framework for legal analysis of products liability to assist courts and counsel in avoiding some of the pitfalls
encountered in development of products liability in other jurisdictions.
I.

THE HISTORY, BACKGROUND AND DEVELOPMENT OF PRODUCTS
LIABILITY

A.

United States - Overview

The history, background and development of products liability
law in the United States need be recounted only briefly. The rule
derived from the English case Winterbottom v. Wright, 16 that the
seller of defective goods was liable only in negligence for damages
caused to his immediate buyer, or to one in privity with him, became the general rule in the United States in the nineteenth century .17 Judicially developed exceptions gradually eroded the general
rule, causing considerable confusion, 18 and in 1916, Judge Cardozo's
landmark opinion in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. 19 finally abolished the requirement of privity. The rule that ultimately has
evolved from MacPherson holds the seller "liable for negligence in
the manufacture or sale of any product which may reasonably be
15. "Products liability law in other states developed through judicial activism. Courts,
faced with legislative silence, adapted the traditional forms of the common law of tort and
breach of warranty to impose liability upon manufacturers of injury-causing products. This
grudging battle to develop products liability through judicial decision and without legislative
aid was not without its toll upon the common law, and the result is a state of law which is in
a large measure irrational and incomprehensible." Maraist & Barksdale, Mississippi Products
Liability - A Critical Analysis, 43 Miss. L.J. 139, 143 (1972).
16. 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (1842).
17. W. PROSSER, supra note 3, § 96, at 641.
18. Id. at 642.
19. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916). As Prosser notes, "Cardozo's opinion struck
through the fog of the 'general rule' and its various exceptions and held the maker liable for
negligence." W. PROSSER, supra note 3, § 96, at 642.
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expected to be capable of inflicting substantial harm if it is defective. " 20
The movement toward imposition of strict liability under the
rubric of warranty coincided with post-MacPherson development of
the negligence doctrine. From the early twentieth century until the
late 1950's, this movement, confined to the area of food and drink,
progressed slowly but steadily. 21 The first real break from food and
drink came in 1958 when a Michigan court found a warranty, without privity and without negligence, for defective cinder blocks. 22
That case was followed closely by the New Jersey decision,
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 23 which permitted the wife
of the buyer of an automobile to recover against the automobile
manufacturer and dealer on an implied warranty of safety, derived
from the food cases and grounded in considerations of public policy.
After Henningsen came a "deluge of cases in other jurisdictions
following the lead of New Jersey, and finding an implied warranty
of safety as to a wide assortment of products." 24
Use of the warranty concept was haunted, however, by many
problems from the past, including continued judicial reliance on
traditional concepts of contract law such as notice and disclaimer both of which are included in the Uniform Sales Act and the Uniform Commercial Code, its successor. Such problems led the courts
in many jurisdictions to abandon the theory of warranty for the rule
of strict liability in tort.
This movement was fostered by twin forces: the draftsmen of
section 402A of the Second Restatement of Torts, who issued their
final draft in 1965, 25 and the California Supreme Court led by Jus20. W. PROSSER, supra note 3, § 96, at 643.
21. "The extension of the implied warranty beyond food and drink for human consumption began with animal food, and what might be called products for intimate bodily use, such
as cosmetics." Id. § 97, at 654.
22. Spence v. Three Rivers Builders & Masonry Supply, Inc., 353 Mich. 120, 90 N.W.2d
873 (1958).
23. 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
24. W. PROSSER, supra note 3, § 97, at 655.
25. Prosser, who was the Reporter for the drafting group, states in his treatise, id.
§ 98, at 657, that they discarded the warranty term in the definition of section 402A and
drafted Comment m, quoted below, to explain their view of warranty under section 402A:
The liability stated in this Section does not rest upon negligence. It is strict liability . . . . The basis of liability is purely one of tort.
A number of courts, seeking a theoretical basis for the liability, have resorted
to a "warranty". . . . In some instances this theory has proved to be an unfortunate
one. Although warranty was in its origin a matter of tort liability, and it is generally
agreed that a tort action will still lie for its breach, it has become so identified in
practice with a contract of sale between the plaintiff and the defendant that the
warranty theory has become something of an obstacle to the recognition of the strict
liability where there is no such contract. There is nothing in this Section which
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tice Traynor, which decided the Greenman case in 1962. Nearly
every State now has adopted some form of strict liability in tort,
which joins negligence and warranty in the arsenal of recovery theories available to injured plaintiffs.

B.
1.

Montana - Overview

Development Prior to Brandenburger

Prior to 1970, there was little of compelling importance in products liability law in Montana. There was an occasional warranty
case, 26 and as early as 1919 in Montana strict liability had been
imposed in a food case under the Pure Food and Drug Act, 27 but
decisional law was otherwise quite meager.
Justice John C. Harrison traced the court's prior consideration
of strict liability in tort in the Brandenburger opinion. He remarked
that the court considered the issue in Jangula v. United States
Rubber Co., 28 but deemed it inapplicable under the facts presented.
Then he discussed three recent cases cited by appellants for the
proposition that the court already had rejected the doctrine. He
concluded that "in each instance the case was decided on grounds
other than strict liability." 29 In Knudson v. Edgewater Automotive
Division, 30 appellants had charged that a particular instruction improperly implied that strict liability applied to manufacturers. Justice Harrison observed that the supreme court there "held that the
trial court did not insert strict liability into the case under the
would prevent any court from treating the rule stated as a matter of "warranty" to
the user or consumer. But if this is done, it should be recognized and understood
that the warranty is a very different kind of warranty from those usually found in
the sale of goods, and that it is not subject to the various contract rules which have
grown up to surround such sales.
26. See Brock v. Rothwell, 154 Mont. 144, 461 P.2d 6 (1969); Ryan v. Aid, Inc., 149
Mont. 367, 427 P.2d 53 (1967); Harrington v. Montgomery Drug. Co., 111 Mont. 564, 111 P.2d
808 (1941). All of these cases were governed by pre-UCC warranty statutes.
27. Kelley v. John R. Daily Co., 56 Mont. 63, 181 P. 326 (1919). The decisionmaking
process employed in Kelley was reaffirmed by the supreme court in Bolitho v. Safeway Stores,
Inc., 109 Mont. 213, 95 P.2d 443 (1939). But see Larson v. United States Rubber Co., 163 F.
Supp. 327 (D. Mont. 1958), in which the Montana federal district court, purporting to apply
Montana law, found that strict liability would not extend to rubber boots, but that lack of
privity would not bar an action for injuries sustained due to negligence of the manufacturer.
28. This case was the subject of two opinions by the supreme court. In Jangula v. United
States Rubber Co., 147 Mont. 98, 410 P.2d 462 (1966), the opinion rendered after rehearing
reversed the judgment for the plaintiff and ordered a new trial. Subsequently, Jangula v.
United States Rubber Co., 149 Mont. 241, 425 P.2d 319 (1967), involved an appeal from the
district court's dismissal of the action for want of prosecution after remand.
29. Brandenburger v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 162 Mont. 506, 510, 513 P.2d
268, 271 (1973).
30. 157 Mont. 400, 486 P.2d 596 (1971).
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instructions given." 31 As for Duchesneau v. Silver Bow County, 32 the
Justice stated that the "case was argued on negligence and not strict
liability" 33 but he noted that Justice Haswell had alluded to the
doctrine in Duchesneau. 34 Justice Harrison disposed of Ford v.
Rupple 35 by merely excerpting pertinent language from the opinion
wherein the court avoided resolution of the issue of applicability of
strict liability in Montana. 36
While these cases were being decided by the Montana Supreme
Court, products litigation was proceeding apace in the Montana
federal courts. As Justice Harrison noted in Brandenburger, "both
the federal district court of Montana and the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals [had] considered Montana case law and [had] anticipated action by this Court, in cases heard in those courts recently."37 He cited an opinion by United States District Court Judge
Russell E. Smith that had noted how federal courts sitting in diversity cases had "looked to and adopted as the applicable rule of law
in Montana the Restatement of Torts, Second, and the strict liability rule announced therein, " 38 and he observed that the Ninth Circuit had made a similar choice. 39
Prior to Brandenburger, the Ninth Circuit had rendered two
31. Brandenburger v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 162 Mont. 506, 510, 513 P.2d
268, 271 (1973).
32. 158 Mont. 369, 492 P.2d 926 (1971).
33. Brandenburger v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 162 Mont. 506, 511, 513 P.2d
268, 271 (1973).
34. Id., quoting the following language: "The foregoing testimony indicates the power
steering unit was purchased in 1967 from Mack Trucks and if it was in fact negligently
designed, there is a possible basis for strict products [sic] liability against Mack Trucks."
Duchesneau v. Silver Bow Company, 158 Mont. 369, 379-80, 492 P.2d 926, 932 (1971).
35. 161 Mont. 56, 504 P.2d 686 (1972).
36. In retrospect, it probably is fortunate that the court decided Ford as it did, thus
providing for the opportunity seized by the court in Brandenburger. This is faint praise, for
the decision is certainly no model of clarity. There are other cases decided by the court in
which it alludes to strict liability but merely notes that it had not bee.n adopted in Montana.
See, e.g., Rauh v. Jensen, 161 Mont. 443, 446-47, 507 P.2d 520, 522 (1973).
37. Brandenburger v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 162 Mont. 506, 512, 513 P.2d
268, 272 (1973). Indeed, the action taken by those courts probably provided much of the
impetus for the ultimate decision of the Montana Supreme Court to adopt section 402A in
Brandenburger.
38. Id. (quoting Hornung v. Richardson-Merrill [sic], Inc., 317 F. Supp. 183, 184 (D.
Mont. 1970)).
39. Id. In Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 399 F.2d 121, 127 (9th Cir. 1968), the Ninth
Circuit stated as follows:
[W)e choose to assume that Montana would follow the majority of other states in
finding that liability can attach to the sale of drugs, in either tort or warranty,
despite lack of privity, and would adopt the views set forth below on the manufacturer's duty to warn of dangers in "nondefective" but potentially harmful products. . . . The clearest statement of the law as it exists today is in our view that
set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965). Relevant to our case are
Section 402A and comments j and k. . . .
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other products liability decisions, purporting to apply Montana substantive law, which received no comment in the opinion. Jacobson
v. Colorado Fuel and Iron Corp. 40 is a "duty to warn" 41 case in
which the Ninth Circuit approved the district court's adoption, as
the law of Montana, of the Restatement (Second) section 388 and
its comment k, referring to circumstances in which warning of defects is unnecessary. The court added that, based on section 402A
and Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 42 Montana law would require
that the manufacturer/supplier be found strictly liable in tort for
any resultant damage in the absence of such warning, if one were
required. 43 Interpreting section 402A, the court distilled from Davis
a rule which "does away with the Restatement requirement that a
product be defective" in those situations where a manufacturer has
a duty to warn of dangers in potentially harmful but non-defective
products. 44
In Tomicich v. Western-Knapp Engineering Co., 45 the plaintiff
contended that defendants had a duty to design a safe product and
were strictly liable for breach of that duty. The court chose to rely
instead on a rule derived from a "general consensus in other jurisdictions," that "manufacturers are under no duty to guard against
or warn of obvious dangers . . . ." 46 The court appeared to recognize
that assumption of risk, but not contributory negligence, continues
to be a valid defense to a strict liability claim.
2.

Brandenburger

In Brandenburger, Justice John C. Harrison, writing for a four
to one majority, acknowledged that the court had "not previously
squarely faced the proposition as to whether or not strict liability is
the applicable law in Montana." 47 After reviewing the relevant case
40. 409 F.2d 1263 (9th Cir. 1969).
41. See generally discussion of liability for inadequate warnings, pp .. 262-67 infra.
42. 399 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1968).
43. Jacobson v. Colorado Fuel & Iron Corp., 409 F.2d 1263, 1270 (9th Cir. 1969).
44. Id. at 1271. The court went on to state that since the purchaser of the product and
its supervising personnel, who employed plaintiff's deceased husband, had full knowledge of
the fact that the particular use being made of defendant's product was extremely hazardous
and potentially harmful, the manufacturer had no duty to warn under the Restatement
(Second) of Torts sections 388 and 402A, and Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 399 F.2d
121 (9th Cir. 1968). Id. at 1273.
45. 423 F.2d 410 (9th Cir. 1970).
46. Id. at 412. While acknowledging that the "Montana court might extend liability
under such a doctrine," the court observed that such extension "would not help Tomicich"
since "he voluntarily exposed himself to the known danger of the machine and was injured."
Id. at 413.
47. Brandenburger v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 162 Mont. 506, 510, 513 P.2d
268, 271 (1973).
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law and noting that federal courts in the Ninth Circuit had anticipated the supreme court's adoption of strict liability,'8 he stated
that "the trend seems to be to adopt the theory of strict liability"
and that "it has now been adopted by a majority of the states."'9
He concluded, therefore, that the court would "adopt the definition
as other jurisdictions have, set forth in 2 Restatement of Torts 2nd
§ 402A . . . . "so
Justice Harrison referred to the policies expressed by Judge
Jacobson in his concurring opinion in Lechuga, Inc. v.
Montgomery.s• Commitment to these policy grounds for adopting
strict liability was confirmed later in the opinion when Justice Harrison stated:
The essential rationale for imposing the doctrine of strict liability
in tort is that such imposition affords the consuming public the
maximum protection from dangerous defects in manufactured
products by requiring the manufacturer to bear the burden of injuries and losses enhanced by such defects in its products. 52

Although the opinion never explicitly delineates the elements which
must be established in a strict liability action, the court presumably
meant to adopt the elements contained in section 402A's definition
by adopting the language of section 402A as other jurisdictions have
done. 53
48. Id. at 512-13, 513 P.2d at 272.
49. Id. at 513, 513 P.2d at 272.
50. Id. at 512, 513 P.2d at 272.
51. 12 Ariz. App. 32, 37-38, 467 P.2d 256, 261-62 (1970), cited in Brandenburger v.
Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 162 Mont. 506, 514-15, 513 P.2d 268, 273 (1973).
52. Brandenburger v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 162 Mont. 506, 517, 513 P.2d
268, 275 (1973).
53. The section reads as follows:
§ 402A Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or Consumer
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to
the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale
of his product, and
b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into
any contractual relation with the seller.
The section contains 3 caveats and 17 comments. It is unclear whether adoption of the section
implies adoption of the comments. Most courts have used the comments as a starting point
in reaching their decisions but have not relied exclusively on them to support their holdings.
See, e.g., Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 399 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1968). Dean Green notes
that in many ways the comments revert to negligence notions of liability, possibly because
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In Brandenburger, the court also adopted the presently emerging majority position regarding the "second collision" issue. 54 Liability for second collision defects means that manufacturers will be
responsible for enhancement of injuries resulting from defects in
their products in the event of a crash or collision, even though the
injury-producing defect did not cause the original collision. The
court also found that this liability could be imposed for injury
caused by "the manufacturer's failure to use reasonable care in
design, " 55 as well as for injury caused by manufacturing flaws or
poor materials.
Regarding the proof required in a products liability case, Justice Harrison found that "adoption of the doctrine of strict liability
does not relieve the plaintiff from the burden of proving his case"
and that "vital to that proof is the necessity of proving the existence
of a defect in the product and that such defect caused the injury
complained of." 56 He rejected, however, defendants' contention that
proof should be limited to direct evidence in product cases. Imposition of such a requirement would mean that "the supposed benefit
of the theory of strict liability would be lost to the consuming public."57 The court held that the "better rule is to permit proof of
defect to be established by circumstantial evidence and inferences
therefrom, as well as by direct evidence." 58

3.

Development Subsequent to Brandenburger

A surprising lull in litigation followed the court's revolutionary
decision in Brandenburger; few Montana Supreme Court opinions
rendered in 1974 or 1975 dealt with strict liability. 59 The court deof the drafters' insecurity with the broad scope of their newly developed theory of liability.
Green, Strict Liability under Sections 402A and 402B: A Decade of Litigation, 54 TEX. L. REv.
1185, 1205 (1976).
54. Brandenburger v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 162 Mont. 506, 516, 513 P.2d
268, 274 (1973).
55. Id. (emphasis added).
56. Id. at 515, 513 P.2d at 274.
57. Id. at 517, 513 P.2d at 275. In taking this position, Justice Harrison relies upon
Lindsay v. McDonnell Douglas Aircraft Corp., 460 F.2d 631, 639 (8th Cir. 1972).
58. Brandenburger v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 162 Mont. 506, 517, 513 P.2d
268, 274 (1973). Justice Harrison purports to adopt a standard of proof as to the "type of
evidence to be used by a plaintiff to prove a defect . . . in a strict liability case" taken from
Stewart v. Budget Rent-A-Car Corp., 52 Hawaii 71, 76, 470 P.2d 240, 243 (1970). 162 Mont.
at 517-18, 513 P.2d at 275. The court reaffirms the rule as to circumstantial evidence in
McGuire v. Nelson, 167 Mont. 188, 196-97, 536 P.2d 768, 773 (1975), and Barich v. Ottenstror,
_Mont._, 550 P.2d 395, 397 (1976).
59. McGuire v. Nelson, 167 Mont. 188, 536 P.2d 768 (1975), reaffirmed the use of
circumstantial evidence to prove a strict liability claim and discussed the role of expert
witnesses in a strict liability case, but did little else to further strict liability jµrisprudence.
Oltz v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 166 Mont. 217, 531 P.2d 1341 (1975), dealt with
the same accident as Brandenburger. See note 342 infra.
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cided two cases raising strict liability issues in 1976; however, only
Barich v. Ottenstror8° is significant.
In Barich, plaintiff sought damages on negligence, warranty
and strict liability grounds for injuries sustained when a cardboard
wardrobe constructed by defendant ripped as she was lifting it,
causing her to fall backward breaking her wrist. 81 In analyzing the
plaintiff's claim, the court turned to Prosser as authority for determining the necessary elements of proof in a products liability case82
and explicitly adopted the elements it impliedly had set out in
Brandenburger. 63 Then, it reiterated the rule in Brandenburger that
the proof of defect could be circumstantial. 64
In the opinion, Justice Harrison focused on the requirement
that the defect in the product exist at the time the defendant was
in possession or control of it. The court noted that the plaintiff has
this burden of proof and found that the plaintiff failed "to come
forward with proof overcoming the inference" derived from the defendant's proof that the "product had been used for a considerable
length of time following its manufacture and sale." 85 Evidence indicated the cardboard product had been utilized twice in cross country moves and had been subject to temperature variations over its
60. _Mont._, 550 P.2d 395 (1976). Reeves v. Ille Electric Co.,_ Mont._,
551 P.2d 647 (1976), was brought on a strict liability theory, but the court treats only the
question of applicability of the statute of limitations.
61. Barich v. Ottenstror, _Mont. __, 550 P.2d 395, 396-97 (1976).
62. Id. at 397-98, quoting Dean Prosser's discussion of the elements that must be established before recovery can be had in a products liability action:
The proof required of a plaintiff seeking to recover for injuries from an unsafe
product is very largely the same, whether his cause of action rests upon negligence,
warranty, or strict liability in tort.
On any of the three bases of liability, the plaintiff has the initial burden of
establishing three things. The first is that he has been injured by the product. . . .
The second is that the injury occurred because the product was defective, unreasonably unsafe. . . . The third is that the defect existed when the product left the
hands of the particular defendant.
W. PROSSER, supra note 3, § 103, at 671-72.
63. The court seems to reject any suggestion that a distinction can be made between
the elements required when proceeding under strict liability rather than negligence or warranty when it states that these "elements are requisite proof in products liability cases
regardless of the theory of liability advanced." Barich v. Ottenstror, _Mont._, 550
P.2d 395, 398 (1976).
64. Id. at 397, stating that the court had "previously established that proof of the defect
may be made through inferences drawn from circumstantial evidence, as well as by direct
evidence."
65. Id. at 398. In fleshing out the requirement as to proof regarding defectiveness at the
time the product leaves the manufacturer, the court notes that the rule that a "specific defect
need not be shown where the evidence tends to negate injury producing causes which do not
relate to a defect . . . cannot be applied unless the evidence also negates the misuse or
mishandling of the product by the plaintiff." Id. The court derived this proposition from
Franks v. National Dairy Prods. Corp., 414 F.2d 682 (5th Cir. 1969).
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two year life. The court found that "a manufacturer or seller is not
required, under the law, to produce or sell a product that will never
wear out. " 88
Jackson v. Coast Paint & Lacquer Co. 87 is the only substantive
decision rendered by a Montana federal court subsequent to
Brandenburger. 88 The Ninth Circuit found that instructions given
by the trial court on duty to warn and contributory negligence in
the context of strict liability were improper. The court relied on
Davis for the proposition that presence of a manufacturing defect
is not required in those situations where a properly manufactured
product is rendered unreasonably dangerous through failure to warn
of its dangerous characteristics. 89 The court found the duty-to-warn
instruction erroneous in three respects: 1) it suggested that liability
is based on negligence rather than strict liability; 2) it presented the
question of plaintiff's actual knowledge, rather than what generally
is known and recognized, as being determinative of whether the
absence of warning rendered the product unreasonably dangerous;
and 3) it stated that the requirement of duty to warn of the danger
would be discharged by informing the employer alone rather than
the user of the product. 70 Regarding the contributory negligence
instruction, the Ninth Circuit recognized that the defense described
in comment n of section 402A, which "passes under the name of
assumption of risk," 71 applies only when the plaintiff himself, the
"user or consumer," is aware of and unreasonably embraces the
danger. 72
II.

THEORIES OF RECOVERY

The Montana Supreme Court and members of the bar in this
State must ensure that products liability litigation does not create
the confusion which has plagued other jurisdictions. Attorneys can
promote clarity in the law by educating themselves and by presenting issues to the courts in this complex, new area in a lucid and
concise manner. The bench can foster such clarity by educating
66. Barich v. Ottenstror, _Mont._, 550 P.2d 395, 398 (1976).
67. 499 F.2d 809 (9th Cir. 1974).
68. The facts presented in Lehtonen v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours, Inc., 389 F. Supp.
633 (D. Mont. 1975), certainly raise product liability issues; however, the case was dismissed
on procedural grounds.
69. Jackson v. Coast Paint & Lacquer Co., 499 F.2d 809, 811 (9th Cir. 1974).
70. Id. at 812-14.
71. Id. at 815. This assumption of risk "must be subjective, conscious and personal to
the plaintiff. . . . Therefore, any knowledge plaintiff's employer may have had concerning
the hazard which resulted in plaintiff's injury is irrelevant where the employer did not in fact
communicate any superior knowledge to plaintiff prior to the accident." Id. at 815.
72. Id.
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themselves, by requiring the bar to present clearly the issues for
resolution, and by writing accurate and precise opinions.
A major source of confusion in other states is the existence of
three distinct but overlapping legal theories - negligence, warranty
and strict liability - on which to premise liability. 73 Courts have
shown little inclination to delineate clearly, and to keep separate,
these three theories of recovery. 74 Attorneys have added to the confusion by failing to plead carefully their claims and by intermingling
the three theories in trying cases. 75

A.

Negligence

Negligence was the theory first used to seek recovery in products liability, but development of the theory was stifled by
Winterbottom v. Wright 18 and the interpretation placed on that
opinion by courts in the nineteenth century. By the time manufacturer/supplier/seller liability to the ultimate consumer had been
firmly established in negligence after MacPherson, warranty already had become important as a possible alternative basis for recovery. Moreover, negligence poses certain difficulties for the plaintiff, especially as to proof, not presented either by strict liability in
warranty or in tort. Thus, while negligence was the first of the three
theories to be used and while it continues to be used in many products liability cases, it has never been a very effective theory for
plaintiffs.
While ascendence of liability based on the warranty and strict
liability in tort theories has caused a corresponding decline in the
73. See J. HENDERSON & R. PEARSON, supra note 3, at 546. See generally W. PROSSER,
supra note 3, ch. 17.
74. This problem is exemplified by the following language from Hornung v. RichardsonMerrill [sic], Inc., 317 F. Supp. 183, 184 (D. Mont. 1970): "[T]he difference between
warranty and strict liability in tort is in terminology and the elements of the liability are the
same." See also Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 399 F.2d 121, 126 (9th Cir. 1968).
75. "The development and recognition of strict liability has had a natural tendency to
reduce_ the number of actions founded on negligence; but it continues to have a great deal of
·importance, if only because counsel for the plaintiff, for reasons readily understandable, have
continued to plead and endeavor to prove it." W. PROSSER, supra note 3, § 96, at 644. The
reasons that Prosser gives for continuing reliance on negligence are the "relative unfamiliarity
of counsel with the strict liability, and the rules to be applied to it, so that they tend to fall
back upon a second string to the bow" and "the possible effect upon the jury of evidence of
negligence, in determining the size of the verdict." Id. § 96, at 644 n. 39. Prosser's first reason
is correct as far as it goes; counsel will plead and attempt to prove warranty as well because
they may be more comfortable with it, because it adds a third arrow to the quiver, and
because warranty may be easier to prove than negligence. There also may be substantial risks
to plaintiffs' counsel in relying solely on a strict liability theory of recovery. See discussion
pp. 270, 273-74 infra. Finally, design defects and inadequate warnings, though grounds for
strict liability, are treated quite often by the courts, counsel, and commentators in terms of
negligence. W. PROSSER, supra note 3, § 96, at 644-49.
76. 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (1842).
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number and importance of actions founded on negligence, the negligence theory continues to have substantial vitality.77 Moreover, negligence language and concepts have shown a marked tendency to
creep into strict liability trial court litigation and appellate court
analysis.
The Montana Supreme Court employed negligence language
and concepts as a basis for recovery for defective goods in a 1919
decision, Kelley u. John R. Daily Co. 78 The holding in Kelley was
reaffirmed in 1939 in Bolitho u. Safeway Stores, Inc. ;79 however, few
if any suits which could be labeled products actions were brought
in state courts on a negligence theory between 1939 and the late
1960's. 80
The Montana federal district court in Larson u. United States
Rubber Co. ,81 offered telling comment about negligence-based products liability actions in Montana. The court phrased the question
as "whether a manufacturer of an article may be held responsible
for his negligence in manufacturing such article to the user of the
article injured as a result of such negligence, where there is no
privity between the manufacturer and user." The court observed
that "there is no Montana Statute [sic] or decision which covers
the precise question." 82 The court then traced the historical development of the negligence theory, discussing the "Winterbottom
rule," exceptions thereto, and MacPherson and its widespread acceptance. It concluded that liability under the rule of MacPherson
"would likewise be accepted by the Supreme Court of Montana"
and "that the Montana court would . . . permit the manufacturer's
liability for negligence to depend upon the doctrines of the law of
negligence, and not upon whether privity of contract existed between the negligent manufacturer and the consumer of the product
who was injured by such negligence." 83 A manufacturer's liability in
negligence to a remote consumer is based on the social policy reason
that it is "more productive of justice in the twentieth century society in which we live" 84 and on the realities of the modern market
77. W. PROSSER, supra note 3, § 96, at 644.
78. 56 Mont. 63, 181 P. 326 (1919).
79. 109 Mont. 213, 95 P.2d 443 (1939).
80. Cf. Zimmer v. California Co., 174 F. Supp. 757 (D. Mont. 1959). The case involved
an action brought by an employee of an independent contractor who was injured "while
working on the installation of a housing unit over the pump of an oil well owned by defendant." The court characterized defendant's duties as those of a landlord rather than a manufacturer or supplier of the product which injured the plaintiff. Id. at 759.
81. 163 F. Supp. 327 (D. Mont. 1958).
82. Id. at 328.
83. Id. at 329.
84. Id.

1977]

PRODUCTS LIABILITY

235

place. 85 The manufacturer's duty not to injure users of its product
"arises not out of contract, but out of the general human duty not
to injure another through disregard of his safety. " 86 The court added
that imposition of liability in negligence will not "work any undue
hardship or injustice on manufacturers . . . . " 87
Since the mid-1960's, the Montana Supreme Court has decided
several product cases brought on negligence theories. In Jangula u.
United States Rubber Co., 88 plaintiff alleged that he was injured by
defendant's negligently manufactured product. Although he prevailed at the trial court level, the Montana Supreme Court found
that certain expert testimony was improper and returned the case
to the district court for a new trial. The court acknowledged in
Knowlton u. Sandaker8 9 that a cause of action exists in Montana for
negligent failure to make a chattel safe for use or to discover and
warn users of defects, referring to section 392 of the Second Restatement as supporting authority. 90
The supreme court dealt with the question of alleged negligence
in design of a product in Knudson u. Edgewater Automotive
Diuision, 91 finding that a manufacturer is liable if he is negligent in
designing a product and the design defect causes injury to a con85. In this regard, the court observed:
The [privity] rule was formulated in 1842, and may have been appropriate at that
time in a society where our modern methods of mass production and distribution
of products were unknown; where in most instances the consumer dealt directly
with the manufacturer, and the products purchased were generally simple, and as
susceptible to inspection and understanding by the purchaser and retailer as to the
manufacturer. Today, however, in our society of mass production and distribution,
manufacturing processes are far more complex, defects in a product caused by
negligence may be highly dangerous to life or limb, no matter what the product is,
and yet not discernible to either the retailer or consumer. . . . Then, too, modern
mass production manufacturers produce their products with the ultimate user in
mind; these products are not produced for the use of the jobber or retailer who may
be in privity with the manufacturer.
Id. at 329-30.
86. Id. at 330.
87. Id.
88. 147 Mont. 98, 410 P.2d 462 (1966).
89. 150 Mont. 438, 436 P.2d 98 (1968).
90. Id. at 445, 436 P.2d at 102, quoting the section as follows:
One who supplies to another, directly or through a third person, a chattel to be used·
for the supplier's business purposes is subject to liability to those for whose use the
chattel is supplied, or those whom he should expect to be endangered by its probable use, for physical harm caused by the use of the chattel in the manner for which
and by persons for whose use the chattel is supplied (a) if the supplier fails to
exercise reasonable care to make the chattel safe for the use for which it is supplied,
or (b) if he fails to exercise reasonable care to discover its dangerous condition or
character, and to inform those whom he should expect to use it.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 392 (1965).
91. 157 Mont. 400, 486 P.2d 596 (1971).
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sumer. 92 That portion of the opinion dealing with the trial court's
instructions is particularly informative. The court upheld an instruction that the "manufacturer of a product that is reasonably
certain to be dangerous if negligently made has a duty to exercise
reasonable care in the design, testing, inspection and manufacture
of such product" and that "a failure to fulfill that duty is negligence."93 The court also approved instructions that a "manufacturer
does not have the status of an insurer as respects the design of his
product since it is obvious that virtually any article . . . is capable
of producing injury when put to particular uses or misuses" and that
a manufacturer has no duty to "furnish a machine that will not wear
out." 94 Furthermore, the court sustained instructions regarding intended and proper use by plaintiff and duty to warn on the part of
a manufacturer of dangerous products. 95
In another action, Ford v. Rupple, 96 brought for alleged negligent design, the court considered whether it would hold an automobile manufacturer liable for injuries arising out of negligent failure to make an automobile crashworthy. The court viewed the issue
as one of foreseeability and duty, and decided after considerable
discussion of other negligence principles that the manufacturer's
duty was not as extensive as urged by the plaintiff. 97 The court thus
had analyzed and rejected the theory of second collision liability
prior to its eventual adoption in Brandenburger. The cases are distinguishable, however, because Ford was pleaded, tried, and reviewed as a claim in negligence only, whereas in Brandenburger,
there was little reason to continue to preclude second collision liability once the court had abandoned exclusive reliance on negligence
as the theory of recovery. Because foreseeability and proximate
cause are negligence concepts and because foreseeability is, therefore, of limited applicability and proximate cause is of no applicability under strict liability, they should not now be allowed to prevent recovery as they did in Ford.
In Duchesneau v. Silver Bow County, 98 the supreme court exhibited the linguistic confusion endemic to products litigation
which has plagued courts in other jurisdictions. 99 In one breath the
92. See also further discussion of this case pp. 259-60 infra.
93. Knudson v. Edgewater Automotive Div., 157 Mont. 400, 414, 486 P.2d 596, 604
(1971).
94. Id. at 414-15, 486 P.2d at 604.
95. Id. at 415, 486 P.2d at 604.
96. 161 Mont. 56, 504 P.2d 686 (1972).
97. Id. at 65, 504 P.2d at 691.
98. 158 Mont. 369, 492 P.2d 926 (1971).
99. See, e.g., Hauter v. Zogarts, 14 Cal.3d 104, 534 P.2d 377, 120 Cal. Rptr. 681 (1975).
Cf. Roach v. Kononen, 269 Ore. 457, 525 P.2d 125 (1974) (court cites numerous cases cilscuss-
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court found it unnecessary to determine whether strict liability
under section 402A should be adopted in Montana 100 because on the
facts it appeared that the gist of the claim was for negligent design
and manufacture; in the next breath, it commingled the language
of strict liability and negligence stating "if [the product] was in
fact negligently designed, there is a possible basis for strict products liability against [the manufacturer]." 101 This is exactly the
kind of linguistic and conceptual imprecision which has resulted in
confusion in other jurisdictions and which must be avoided here.
Fortunately, the language in Duchesneau was merely dicta, and the
case was remanded on other grounds.
Commingling of negligence theories by counsel with other liability theories occurred in another recent case, McGuire v. Nelson. 102
Plaintiff sued originally in negligence, for the sale of an improper
size tire for his motorcycle which allegedly caused him to crash. Just
prior to trial he amended his complaint to encompass a warranty
theory as well as negligence. The court delineated the mutual exclusiveness of the two theories: "(N]egligence, either on the part of
defendant or plaintiff, has no place in an action for an alleged
breach of warranty" and "similarly, warranty theories are irrelevant
to a negligence case." 103 The court showed laudable concern about
possible confusion of the jury and ordered a new trial because of
improper mixing of theories in the instructions to the jury. 10~
These cases and others 105 demonstrate that both lawyers and
judges in Montana still seem to be relying on combinations of negligence and strict liability theories, and often on warranty as well. It
appears tliat counsel have not always thoroughly evaluated the
ing differences between negligence and strict liability before effectively distinguishing the
theories).
100. Duchesneau v. Silver Bow County, 158 Mont. 369, 378, 492 P.2d 926, 931 (1971).
101. Id. at 380, 492 P.2d at 932 (emphasis added).
102. 162 Mont. 37, 508 P.2d 558 (1973). The case was remanded to the district court
for a new trial. The opinion rendered in an appeal from a directed verdict entered at the retrial
is McGuire v. Nelson, 167 Mont. 188, 536 P.2d 768 (1975).
103. McGuire v. Nelson, 162 Mont. 37, 42, 508 P.2d 558, 560 (1973). The following
excerpt explains the unusual fact situation presented in the case and the court's resolution
of some of the problems thereby presented:
What plaintiff actually suggests is not that the tire itself was defective, but the sale
of the tire to the plaintiff's agent was defective. But, such suggestion only further
confuses the issue. To say the sale was defective necessarily implies the sale was
negligent. We find little support for the theory that an allegedly negligent act is a
defect. All cases facing the issues properly indicate that the defect must be in the
product itself.
Id. at 43-44, 508 P.2d at 561.
104. Id. at 46, 508 P.2d at 562.
105. See, e.g., Hornung v. Richardson-Merrill [sic], Inc., 317 F. Supp. 183 (D. Mont.
1970).
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theories of recovery in advance of commencing litigation. In several
cases counsel have amended complaints to add strict liability
and/or warranty theories 106 and even new parties, 107 and characterization of the theories 108 relied upon leaves doubt as to counsel's
comprehension of the issues.

B.

Warranty

A movement toward imposition of strict liability under a warranty theory for certain defective products developed at the turn of
the century simultaneously with the evolution of judicially imposed
negligence liability without privity .109 Courts have posited various
policy arguments for imposition of strict liability. Prosser condenses
these into three, which may be summarized as follows:
1) The public interest demands maximum protection from defects in products used by consumers who cannot protect themselves.
2) The manufacturer by placing his goods on the market represents to the public that they are suitable and safe for use.
3) The manufacturer could be held liable anyway by resort to a
series of actions beginning with the retailer and then seeking indemnification from successive parties in the distribution chain;
therefore, economies of time, money, and effort justify direct suits
against the manufacturer." 0

Warranty liability, which orginated in tort and is allied with
concepts of fraud and misrepresentation, has been termed a hybrid
of contract and tort. 111 It arises out of the relationship between buyer
and seller and depends upon the failure of the goods sold to meet
the expectations of the buyer. Liability under warranty comprises
two discrete classes - express warranty made by the manufacturer
directly to the consumer and implied warranties running with the
goods.

1.

Express Warranty
Liability for express warranty originated with Baxter u. Ford

106. See, e.g., Barich v. Ottenstror, _Mont. __ , 550 P.2d 395, 396 (1976); McGuire
v. Nelson, 167 Mont. 188, 190-91, 536 P.2d 768, 770 (1975).
107. See McGuire v. Nelson, 167 Mont. 188, 190-91, 536 P.2d 768, 770 (1975).
108. See Tomicich v. Western-Knapp Eng'r, Co., 423 F.2d 410, 411 (9th Cir. 1970). The
court said that "Tomicich's theory is that the defendants had a duty to design a safe product
and were strictly liable for a breach of that duty . . . ."Id.
109. The latter culminated with Judge Cardozo's landmark opinion in MacPherson v.
Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111N.E.1050 (1916).
110. W. PROSSER, supra note 3, § 97, at 650-51.
111. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE
L.J. 1099, 1126 (1960).
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Motor Co. 112 in 1932. The defendant manufacturer had advertised
in promotional literature that the glass in its windshields was
"shatterproof." Based on that express representation, the Washington Supreme Court held that the manufacturer was strictly liable
to persons buying cars, for injuries resulting from shattered glass,
and that no privity of contract between the manufacturer and the
consumer was required. Today it is clear that the rule of the Baxter
case is established firmly; 113 the rule, however, is subject to certain
limitations: 1) there must be some positive misrepresentation of
fact, 2) the misrepresentation must be made by the defendant or
chargeable against him, 3) the misrepresentation must be made
with the intention or expectation that it will reach the plaintiff or a
class of persons including him, 4) the plaintiff must show that he
knew of, and relied on, the misrepresentation of the defendant.1 14
These limitations mean that the rule of strict liability based upon
an express warranty, although clear, often has less applicability and
effect than implied warranties.
2.

Implied Warranties

The movement toward imposition of implied warranties centered on liability for manufacture of adulterated food and drink 115
and was a judicial response to widespread social agitation for reform.116 The new strict liability for such products arose out of what
courts labeled an implied warranty by the manufacturer that the
goods were fit for consumption. 117 Initially, courts grounded liability
simply on public policy grounds. 118 Based on the contract origins of
warranty, some courts found the theoretical underpinnings for implied warranties in the idea of an implied warranty running with the
goods, and the cause of action for breach was couched in contract
terms. Over time, however, courts recognized that the warranty did
112. 168 Wash. 456, 12 P.2d 409 (1932), aff'd on rehearing, 168 Wash. 465, 15 P.2d 1118
(1932). On a second appeal of the case, the court found for the plaintiff on a theory of strict
liability for innocent misrepresentation. Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 179 Wash. 123, 35 P.2d
1090 (1934).
113. W. PROSSER, supra note 3, § 97, at 652.
114. Id. at 653.
115. E.g., Mazetti v. Armour & Co., 75 Wash. 622, 135 P. 633 (1913).
116. See, e.g., U. SINCLAIR, THE JUNGLE (1906). See also Regier, The Struggle for Federal
Food and Drugs Legislation, 1 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROB. 3 (1933). Unwholesome food and drink
traditionally came under special judicial scrutiny. W. PROSSER, supra note 3, § 97, at 653; R.
DICKERSON, PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND THE FOOD CONSUMER 26 (1951); Perkins, Unwholesome
Food as a Source of Liability, 5 low AL. BULL. 6, 8-9 (1919).
117. Prosser, supra note 111, at 1124-26. ·
118. Id. at 1124.
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not depend upon the existence of a contract and imposed liability
in tort. 119
Extension of implied warranties beyond food and drink to
drugs, animal foods and products for intimate bodily use, such as
cosmetics, progressed slowly until mid-century . 120 The breakthrough
did not come until 1960 with Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors,
Inc. 121 in which the New Jersey Supreme Court recognized that the
realities of modern merchandising and the resultant unfair bargaining position between consumers and certain types of manufacturers,
such as automobile makers, justified charging those manufacturers
with an implied warranty of safety. 122
Courts and commentators recognized after Henningsen that use
of implied warranty as a theory for products liability was quite
problematic. Prosser described warranty as a "freak hybrid, born of
the illicit intercourse of tort and contract." 123 Although originating
in a consensual relationship, it sounded in tort and was closely allied
to traditional liability for deceit or misrepresentation. In 1960, he
argued that this illicit hybridization would result in considerable
difficulty because the term had become associated in the minds of
judges and attorneys with contract law. 124 As such, they presumed
that contract rules would apply even though those rules burdened
plaintiffs' causes of action and undercut the policies behind the
creation of the liability. Thus, impediments to suit were created
unwittingly by courts which continued to search for some kind of
consensual relation between the parties and to require some proof
of reliance by the plaintiff. Moreover, contract rules limiting damages, allowing disclaimers and narrowing the scope of interests protected precluded liability.125 Prosser contended:
"[W]arranty," as a device for the justification of strict liability
to the consumer, carries far too much luggage in the way of undesirable complications, and is leading us down a very thorny path
. . . . If there is to be strict liability in tort, let there be strict
liability in tort, declared outright, without an illusory contract
mask. 126

Prosser's criticisms and pleas for adoption of strict liability in
119.
v. Capps,
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

W. PROSSER, supra note 3, § 97, at 654 (citing, e.g., Jacob E. Decker & Sons, Inc.
139 Tex. 609, 164 S.W.2d 828 (1942)).
W. PROSSER, supra note 3, § 97, at 653-54.
32 N.J.358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
Id. at 384, 161 A.2d at 84.
Prosser, supra note 111, at l126.
Id. at 1133-34.
Id. at 1127-32.
Id. at 1133-34.
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tort were answered in 1962 by Justice Traynor, writing for the California Supreme Court in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc .. 127
Justice Traynor, an early advocate of this approach to products
liability, 128 rejected the defendants' reliance on the plaintiff's failure
to give timely notice of the defect required by warranty law, and on
prior California case law limiting warranty without privity to food
and drugs; he expressly stated that defendants' liability was not
based on warranty but on strict liability in tort. 129 He reasoned that
warranty rules, developed to meet the needs of commercial transactions, should not be invoked to govern liability for persons injured
by defective products. "A manufacturer is strictly liable in tort
when an article he places on the market, knowing that it is to be
used without inspection for defects, proves to have a defect that
causes injury to a human being." 130
In 1965, the American Law Institute published section 402A of
the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS which enunciated strict tort
liability for products placed on the market in a defective condition
unreasonably dangerous. 131 The drafters in that section purported to
establish a theory of liability for inadequate, injurious products distinct from either warranty or negligence, unencumbered by the traditional deficiencies of either theory.13 2
In Montana, the legislature adopted a Pure Food and Drug
Act 133 in 1911 presumably in response to the same social pressures
which led to judicial development of implied warranties elsewhere.
In an early case involving a civil cause of action for damages resulting from consumption of bad pork, the Montana Supreme Court
construed the Act as creating a broad duty in sellers of food to the
public. 134 Read together with another statutory warranty, 135 the Act
imposed a form of strict liability; any violation of the statutory duty
was deemed negligence per se 136 because the seller was made an
"insurer of the purity of food products." 137 The court referred to both
negligence and warranty, but said that it was "immaterial whether
127. 59 Cal.2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
128. See Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal.2d 453, 150 P.2d 436, 440 (1944)
(Traynor, J., concurring).
129. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal.2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 901, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 697, 701 (1962).
130. Id., 377 P.2d at 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700.
131. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 402A (1965).
132. w. PROSSER, supra note 3, § 98, at 656-58; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 402A,
Comment m (1965).
133. 1911 MONT. LAWS, ch. 130 (repealed 1967).
134. Kelley v. John R. Daily Co., 56 Mont. 63, 181 P. 326 (1919).
135. 1895 Civ. C. § 2382 (repealed 1963).
136. Kelley v. John R. Daily Co., 56 Mont. 63, 74, 181 P. 326, 329 (1919).
137. Id.
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the foundation is laid in negligence or warranty." 138 A subsequent
food case simply reaffirmed the principles set out in the first case. 139
During this same period, the Montana Supreme Court was less
willing to impose any legal duties upon sellers of defective non-food
products, despite statutory provision for warranties on certain sales
and exchanges. 140 As long as a consumer, prior to purchase, saw the
goods he ultimately received, there was no liability to the seller,
even though the goods were not as the seller represented them. 141
Contracts for sale did not necessarily imply any warranty and no
express warranty arose from a statement that a product "worked."
Only when a buyer relied on the seller's judgment and the seller
knew of that reliance did any warranty arise. 142 Although statutes
imposed certain warranties on sales and exchanges 143 which became
part of the contract, those terms were to be viewed in light of express
terms; and thus, failure to comply with express terms, precluded
reliance on any statutorily imposed terms. 144 Notably, no warranty
case, except for the food cases, came before the court in which the
plaintiff sought recovery for physical injury resulting from a defective product.
The court's reluctance to find any warranty-based liability for
defective products continued through the 1960's. In one case, the
court rejected arguments by plaintiff's counsel regarding implied
warranties of fitness, finding that the seller who was not a manufacturer was not subject to an implied warranty of fitness for intended
use. 145 Subsequently, the court refused to find any liability for damages resulting from a blow-out of a recapped tire, holding that no
warranties applied. 146 In one case, at least one member of the court
acknowledged that an implied warranty from the manufacturer
might exist, but the plaintiff's failure to plead implied warranty
precluded the court's consideration of that issue. 147 The majority
found that no express warranty could arise when the product in
question was distributed nationally. 148 In 1973, the Montana Su138. Id.
139. See Bolitho v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 109 Mont. 213, 95 P.2d 443 (1939).
140. REVISED CODES OF MONTANA (1947) [hereinafter cited as R.C.M. 1947]. §§ 74-310
to 320.
141. Kircher v. Conrad, 9 Mont. 191, 23 P. 74 (1890) (winter wheat instead of spring
wheat).
142. Jones v. Armstrong, 50 Mont. 168, 145 P. 949 (1915) (defective plow).
143. R.C.M. 1947, §§ 74-310 to 320.
144. Rowe v. Emerson-Brantingham Implement Co., 61 Mont. 73, 201 P. 316 (1921).
145. Ryan v. Aid, Inc., 149 Mont. 367, 427 P.2d 53 (1967).
146. Brock v. Rothwell, 154 Mont. 144, 461 P.2d 6 (1969).
147. Jangula v. United States Rubber Co., 147 Mont. 98, 115, 410 P.2d 462, 470 (1966)
(Harrison, J., concurring).
148. Id. at 110, 410 P.2d at 468.
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preme Court joined the great majority of American jurisdictions by
adopting section 402A. 149

3.

Uniform Commercial Code

It is unclear how warranty liability for defective products provided by the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) will interface with
strict tort liability under section 402A. The UCC specifically provides for manufacturer liability for defective products as a breach
of an implied warranty of merchantability, 150 and permits recovery
of consequential damages for breaches, including damages for physical injury to person and property. 151 Thus, the UCC would appear
to cover much the same ground as section 402A. The distinctions
between the UCC's provisions for defective products and strict liability in tort under section 402A derive from the UCC's grounding
in commercial law governing consensual transactions. As such, the
UCC allows disclaimer of any implied warranty, 152 provides for limitation or exclusion of damages, 153 and bars all liability unless the
buyer gives notice of the defect within a reasonable time. 154 Furthermore, one comment to the official draft of the UCC indicates that
contributory negligence may be raised as a defense in a warranty
action. 155
Faced with cases in which plaintiffs have pleaded in the alternative, courts have responded erratically. Some have dismissed
implied warranty entirely, 156 while others have simply found that
actions in tort were preferable. 157 By failing to effectively distinguish
between the nature of the liability under each theory, courts have
also reached distinct and inconsistent conclusions regarding procedural questions, such as statutes of limitations, applicable to a
given cause of action. 158
Many commentators have argued that, because the UCC is a
comprehensive legislative scheme which provides specific remedies
149. Brandenburger v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 162 Mont. 506, 513 P.2d 268
(1973). See generally discussion pp. 228-30 supra.
150. R.C.M. 1947, § 87A-2-314.
151. Id. § 87A-2-715.
152. Id. § 87A-2-316.
153. Id. § 87A-2-719.
154. Id. § 87A-2-607.
155. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-715, Comment 5.
156. E.g., Hawkeye Security Ins. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 199 N.W.2d 373, 382 (Iowa
1972).
157. E.g., Caruth v. Mariani, 11 Ariz. App. 188, 192, 463 P.2d 83, 87 (1970).
158. Compare Hornung v. Richardson-Merrill [sic], Inc., 317 F. Supp. 183 (D. Mont.
1970) with Mendel v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 25 N.Y.2d 340, 253 N.E.2d 207, 305
N.Y.S.2d 490 (1969). In the former, a tort statute of limitations was found applicable, while
in tk llltter the UCC statute controlled.

244

MONTANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38

for defective products, it should preempt concepts of strict liability
in tort developed judicially and under section 402A. 159 Some have
felt that the Restatement section had no case support prior to its
adoption, that the UCC draftsmen intended to provide a legislative
solution to the problem, and that principles of legislative supremacy
should therefore control. 160 Their argument is that legislatures
adopting the UCC expressly limited manufacturers' additional liability and in doing so they deprived courts of the authority to create
law in the area. 161
One commentator, Professor Shanker, contends that those elements of the UCC's warranty scheme which might otherwise prevent consumer recovery such as privity, notice, and exclusions of
remedies, can be mitigated effectively by careful judicial creativity
in construing those sections and their accompanying comments. 162
He points to one of the comments to the privity section which suggests that courts are not entirely tied to the Code rules in all situations.163 Then he shows how the notice requirements do not necessarily apply to remote parties. 164 He concludes, however, by acknowledging that a manufacturer may effectively exclude all warranties.165
On the other side of the question, forceful and convincing authorities have advocated the demise ofUCC warranty in cases where
deficient products result in physical injury. In reply to Professor
Shanker, one commentator noted that the path Shanker would have
courts follow to arrive at equivalent protecton for injured plaintiffs
under the UCC was "tortuous and full of pitfalls," 166 echoing earlier
159. Titus, Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 402A and the Uniform Commercial
Code, 22 STAN. L. R.Ev. 713 (1970); Dickerson, The ABC's of Products Liability - With a Close
Look at Section 402A and the Code, 36 TENN. L. R.Ev. 439 (1969); Franklin, When Worlds
Collide: Liability Theories and Disclaimers in Defective Product Cases, 18 STAN. L. R.Ev. 974
(1966); Shanker, Strict Tort Theory of Products Liability and the Uniform Commercial Code:
A Commentary on Jurisprudential Eclipses, Pigeonholes and Communication Barriers, 17 W.
RES. L. REv. 5 (1965); Speidel, The Virginia "Anti-Privity" Statute: Strict Products Liability
under the Uniform Commercial Code, 51 VA. L. R.Ev. 804 (1965).
160. See, e.g., Titus, supra note 159, at 718. He points out that code § 2-318 read with
the comments eases privity, that § 2-719(3) bars limitation of remedies for personal injury,
that § 2-316 imposes strict procedural requisites fnr disclaimers, and that § 2-607 and its
comments afford consumers sufficient time to give notice. Therefore, he argues, because the
code has provided such a comprehensive scheme of consumer protection, principles of legislative supremacy should control.
161. This argument is summarized though not advocated in Wade, ls Section 402A of
the Second Restatement of Torts Preempted by the UCC and Therefore Unconstitutional?,
42 TENN. L. REV. 123, 124 (1974).
162. Shanker, supra note 159, at 24-30.
163. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-318, Comment 2.
164. Id. § 2-607, Comment 5.
165. Shanker, supra note 159, at 31.
166. Littlefield, Some Thoughts on Products Liability Law: A Reply to Professor
Shanker, 18 W.RES. L. REV. 10, 18 (1966).
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concerns of Dean Prosser. He suggested that the basic problem was
that the UCC was directed to the "wrong milieu." 167 Warranties
occur in the context of consensual transactions, but in the modern
market the consumer-manufacturer relationship is hardly consensual. Tort law imposes duties as a matter of law, based on social and
public policy, whereas contract and commercial law depend upon
the bargaining-consensual nature of the underlying transaction.
Policies of freedom of contract and bargain undergird the sales
article of the UCC. Adherence to Professor Shanker's route to consumer protection under the Code by excising notice, privity, and
disclaimers, wouid gut the Code's commerciai foundation. Whereas
contract law seeks to protect the expectations of the parties, to give
them the benefit of their bargain, tort law obligations are imposed
because the party's activities have created risks to others. The intrinsic differences between a UCC breach of warranty action and a
section 402A strict-liability-in-tort action manifest themselves
when one compares their respective approaches to damages. Action
under section 402A is specifically dedicated to providing restitution
for physical injury, both to person and to property. In contrast, a
warranty action seeks damages primarily for the lost value of the
deficient goods and only secondarily for consequential harm to person and property. 168
Moreover, Professor Wade has effectively refuted the arguments of legisl~tive preemption by analyzing the drafting history of
the Code. 169 In the 1940's, Karl Llewellyn, the Reporter for the UCC
article on sales, had proposed an entirely new basis for imposition
of liability on manufacturers, the gravamen of which was the act of
placing defective goods on the market. 170 He foresaw an implied
warranty without privity running with the goods as a natural development of the law. In the final version of the Code, due to internal
opposition and fear that such a far-reaching alteration of existing
law would never be accepted by all the states, thereby jeopardizing
the uniformity of commercial law desired by the drafters, that new
basis of liability was deleted. 171 "Thus any attempt to absorb the
negligence law of products liability into the UCC was consciously
and deliberately abandoned." 172
167. Id.
168. R.C.M. 1947, § 87A-2-714.
169. Wade, supra note 161, at 131-33.
170. Id. at 133-36.
171. Id. at 135.
172. Id. at 136. In a recent Maryland case, the court expressly rejected the defendants'
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Strict Liability in Tort-Section 402A of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts

In the early 1960's, the drafting group for the Second Restatement of Torts, which was encountering "great difficulty in stating
a new Sect~on, without running afoul of the statutory limitations on
'warranty,' " 173 finally decided to discard the term and eventually
submitted the following section approved by the American Law
Institute in 1965:
§ 402A. Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm
to User or Consumer.
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumei: or to his property is
subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a
product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer
without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or
entered into any contractual relation with the seller.17'

During this same period, the California Supreme Court judicially imposed strict liability in that State.175 Justice Traynor
brushed aside all difficulties presented by the warranty theory, finding instead that it was not a question of warranty at all, but simply
one of strict liability in tort.11 6 Sweeping nationwide change ensued
as courts in other jurisdictions seized upon that decision and the
Restatement section as the solution to their problems with the warranty theory. 177
More than a decade has passed since adoption by the American
Law Institute of section 402A; it has been incorporated into the law
contention that the passage of the UCC in that State had preempted strict liability in tort
for defective products. Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 363 A.2d 955, 962 (1976).
See also Martin v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., 353 A.2d 581 (Del. 1976).
173. W. PROSSER, supra note 3, § 98, at 657 (footnote omitted). Prosser notes that during
that period the change in the law was so rapid that the section was drafted three times:
"As first submitted to the American Law Institute, it was limited to food and drink. It was
then extended to 'products for intimate bodily use,' and finally to all products." W. PRosSER,
supra note 3, § 98, at 657 n. 51.
174. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
175. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal.2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr.
697 (1962).
176. Id. 377 P.2d at 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700.
177. W. PROSSER, supra note 3, § 98, at 657.
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of almost every State; and thousands of cases have applied the
doctrine of strict liability in tort. Although some issues, such as the
availability of contributory negligence as a defense, now seem settled, 178 numerous other issues remain unresolved. Any attempt to
summarize the present state of strict liability in tort is doomed to
frustration. The entire field is simply too much in flux; however,
some attempt must be made to outline how the controversial issues
are being treated and to suggest how they should be treated in the
future.
1.

Underlying Policies And Express Language of Section 402A

The policies and purposes which support imposition of strict
liability in tort have been expressed in various ways, but they can
be summarized easily. The principal and least questioned purpose
"is to insure that the costs of injuries resulting from defective products are borne by the manufacturers that put such products on the
market rather than by the injured persons who are powerless to
protect themselves." 179 That is, the manufacturer through pricing,
is better able to "spread the risk" created by his product; the product must pay its own way. Injury reparation should be "a cost of
producWm." 180 Moreover, because injuries are a risk of marketing
and producing the product, manufacturers can protect themselves
by acquiring liability insurance. 181 Consumers are less able to protect themselves because they cannot fully insure against such losses,
acquire information about products prior to use, adequately inspect
many complex products, or effectively bargain with manufacturers.1s2
178. See generally discussion pp. 270-80 infra.
179. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal.2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 901, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 697, 701 (1962); accord, Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill.2d 612, 619, 210 N.E.2d 182,
186 (1965); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 379, 161 A.2d 69, 81 (1960).
180. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment c (1965). The full comment
expresses the drafters' conception of the policy basis of the section:
On whatever theory, the justification for the strict liability has been said to be that
the seller, by marketing his product for use and consumption, has undertaken and
assumed a special responsibility toward any member of the consuming public who
may be injured by it; that the public has the right to and does expect, in the case
of products which it needs and for which it is forced to rely upon the seller, that
reputable sellers will stand behind their goods; that public policy demands that the
burden of accide~tal injuries caused by products intended for consumption be
placed upon those who market them, and be treated as a cost of production against
which liability insurance can be obtained; and that the consumer of such products
is entitled to the maximum of protection at the hands of someone, and the proper
persons to afford it are those who market the products.
181. Id. See also Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss.
L.J. 825, 826 (1973).
182. E.g., Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal.2d 453, 150 P.2d 436, 443 (1944)
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Another oft-cited reason for strict liability is the difficulty, if
not impossibility, of showing the manufacturer failed to exercise due
care. 183 Even though res ipsa loquitur may aid the injured party, he
may not have sufficient evidence even to warrant the invocation of
that doctrine and to get his case to the jury.
Justice Harrison in Brandenburger referred to other considerations justifying imposition of strict liability. They include: 1) the
superior ability of the manufacturer to anticipate some hazards and
guard against their occurrence, 2) public interest in deterring distribution of dangerous products, and 3) recognition that a consumer
does not always have the ability to investigate the soundness of a
product. 184
The express language of section 402A often hinders realization
of the core policies underlying strict liability. One commentator
suggests: "Today . . . as litigants continue to urge the courts to
further expand the idea of strict liability for products, all parties
concerned are experiencing increasing frustration at the apparent
limits set to the task of prosecution or defense by the language
technic constraints of Section 402A." 185
The gap between language and underlying philosophy often
causes strained judicial reasoning as courts attempt to reach results
consistent with the core philosophy of strict liability but not explicitly covered by the language of section 402A. The most problematic
language is the phrase used to describe the product as one in a
"defective condition unreasonably dangerous." This section 402A
language can be applied with relative ease and clarity to those situations where the individual unit of the product in question, though
properly designed, is flawed in manufacture, 186 and causes physical
(Traynor, J., concurring). In his concurrence, Justice Traynor foreshad_owed the adoption of
strict liability in 1965. The concurring opinion forcefully and thoroughly details the policy
reasons which justify imposition of liability without proof of negligence. On the issue of the
relationship between the consumer and the manufacturer, Justice Traynor argued:
AP. handicrafts have been replaced by mass production with its great markets and
transportation facilities, the close relationship between the producer and consumer
of a product has been altered. Manufacturing processes, frequently valuable se·
crets, are ordinarily either inaccessible or beyond the ken of the general public. The
consumer no longer has means or skill enough to investigate for himself the soundness of a product. . . .
ld.
183. E.g., id. at 441. See also Wade supra note 181, at 826.
184. Brandenburger v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 162 Mont. 506, 514-15, 513
P.2d 268, 273 (1973).
185. Kiely, supra note 9, at 928. Professor Kiely uses the term language technic as it
was first used by Dean Leon Green to describe the verbalization of a legal idea and the
accompanying process of reasoning from, and relying on, that language to reach decisions.
Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases, 28 CoLUM. L. REv. 1014, 1018 (1928).
186. See, e.g., Findlay v. Copeland Lumber Co., 265 Ore. 300, 509 P.2d 28 (1973)
(misaligned rivet hole in ladder); Cronin v. J.B. E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal.3d 121, 501P.2d1153,
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injury to the plaintiff.
More difficulty arises in those cases where there is no manufacturing flaw or "defect," but instead there is some deficiency in the
design of the entire line of goods which has endangered persons
using it. There, while it may be difficult to say that the product was
in a defective condition, 187 the product nonetheless may be unreasonably dangerous because of unsafe design or failure to warn users
of potential dangers. Despite the apparent constraints of section
402A's language, courts have had little difficulty finding strict liability in such situations. 188 Dean Prosser preferred to classify such
cases under the negiigence theory, 189 and others have agreed with
Prosser that the elements of proof submitted in a strict liability
design case may be the same as in a negligence case; 190 yet many
courts have chosen to treat these cases under strict liability even
though great differences exist between the two theories.
Two examples illustrate how courts have struggled with the
language of section 402A to reach results which are consistent with
their perceived notions of the policies and concepts underlying strict
liability. In the first example, Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 191 the
California Supreme Court effectively abolished the term unreasonably dangerous as an element of strict liability. While recognizing
"that the words 'unreasonably dangerous' may serve the beneficial
purpose of preventing the seller from being treated as the insurer of
its products,''. the Cronin court found that the language has
"burdened the injured plaintiff with proof of an element which rings
of negligence. " 192 The court objected to the "negligence complexion"
of the phrase and observed that the "unreasonably dangerous" re104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972) (pitted, weakened metal in tray shelf hasp); Dunham v. Vaughan
& Bushnell Mfg. Co., 42 Ill.2d 339, 247 N.E.2d 401 (1969) (defective hammer). Cf. Barich v.
Ottenstror _Mont._, 550 P.2d 395 (1976) (allegedly defective cardboard wardrobe).
In such cases the product is defective because it fails to conform to the design specifications
of the manufacturer.
187. When the product has no flaws in manufacture and meets the intended design
specifications of the manufacturer, there is no objective standard for evaluating the
"defectiveness" of the product. See Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 363 A.2d
955, 959 (1976); See also 2 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 16A[4), at 3320 (1976).
188. See, e.g., Seattle-First National Bank v. Tabert, 86 Wash.2d 145, 542 P.2d 774
(1975); Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Ore. 485, 525 P.2d 1033 (1974); Brandenburger
v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 162 Mont. 506, 513 P.2d 268 (1973); Pike v. Frank G.
Hough Co., 2 Cal.3d 465, 467 P.2d 229, 85 Cal. Rptr. 629 (1970).
189. W. PROSSER, supra note 3, § 96, at 644-46."
190. E.g., Wade, supra note 181, at 836-38, 841.
191. 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972).
192. Id. 501 P.2d at 1162, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 442. The court noted that the "very purpose
of our pioneering efforts in this field was to relieve the plaintiff from problems of proof
inherent in pursuing negligence . . . ."Id.
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quirement "represents a step backward in the area pioneered by this
Court." 193 The court saw "no difficulty in applying the Greenman
formulation to the full range of products liability situations, including those involving 'design defects''" .194
In justifying abolition of the "unreasonably dangerous" requirement and in countering the contention that this made the manufacturer an insurer, the court found that manufacturers were protected
by "the necessity of proving that there was a defect in the manufacture or design of the product and that such defect was a proximate
cause of the injuries." 195 In abolishing the requirement for design
defects as well as manufacturing flaws, the court relied on Greenman and reasoned that the "unreasonably dangerous" qualification
should not impose upon plaintiffs different burdens of proof which
are dependent upon often unclear distinctions between manufacturing flaws and design errors. 196
Thus, the court would read inadequate warnings and bad design into the language of defect and, to satisfy its perceptions of the
core philosophy of strict liability, would ignore the language
"unreasonably dangerous." Notably, however, Comment g of section 402A defines "defective condition" in terms of the dangerousness of the product, not in terms of any isolable flaw . 197 The problem
is that the court eliminated unreasonably dangerous but then failed
to give any substantive content to the term "defective condition,"
especially, when it is applied to situations involving inadequate
warnings or design defects.' 98 Under Dean Wade's analysis, the
court's logic breaks down and the lack of content it gives to the
defect notion is accentuated. He concludes that in design defect
cases the "phrase 'defective condition' has no independent meaning
and the attempt to use it is apt to prove misleading." 199 He argues
that the "only real problem is whether the product is 'unreasonably dangerous,' because 'defective condition,' if it is to be applied
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. 501 P.2d at 1162-63, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 442-43. The court recognized that applying strict liability to design defects which plague entire product lines would be more damaging
to the manufacturer, but it decided that "the potential economic loss to a manufacturer
should not be reflected in a different standard of proof for an injured consumer." Id.
197. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 402A, Comment g (1965) ("The rule stated in
this Section applies only where the product is, at the time it leaves the seller's hands, in a
condition not contemplated by the ultimate consumer, which will be unreasonably dangerous
to him." (emphasis added)).
198. The court itself acknowledged that there were inherent difficulties in "giving content to the defectiveness standard." Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal.3d 121, 501 P.2d
1153, 1162 n.16, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433, 442 n.16 (1972).
199. Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5, 15 (1965).
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at all, depends on that."200
Moreover, in rejecting the term "unreasonably dangerous" because it rings of negligence, the court failed to distinguish between
unreasonable conduct, which is truly a negligence concept, and unreasonably dangerous, which is merely a measure of the safety of the
product. Reasonableness necessarily entails a balancing or weighing
of factors, but use of a balancing process does not automatically
mean that the court is improperly relying on negligence concepts
rather than strict liability. In negligence, the balancing measures
the defendant's conduct; in strict liability the balancing measures
the product itself.
In the other example, Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 201
plaintiff sued on theories of negligent manufacture, failure to warn,
strict liability in tort, and breach of implied warranty of fitness after
he contracted polio from a vaccine manufactured by the defendant.
The court began by rejecting any claim of negligent manufacture,
finding that the product was precisely what the manufacturer intended.202 The court looked instead to Comment j of section 402A,
which provides that "where warning is given, the seller may reasonably assume that it will be read and heeded; and a product bearing
such a warning, which is safe for use if it is followed, is not in
defective condition, nor is it unreasonably dangerous." 203
In Davis, the Ninth Circuit regarded "failure to warn, where the
circumstances of sale imposed that duty, as exposing the vendor to
trict [sic] liability in tort . . . . " 204 The court rejected defendant's
contention that section 402A applies "only where unreasonable danger results because of an ascertainable 'defect' or 'impurity' in the
product." 205 Instead, "the true test in a case of this kind is whether
the product was unreasonably dangerous." 208
The court then considered Comment k, 207 regarding unavoidId.
201. 399 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1968).
202. Id. at 126.
203. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 402A, Commentj (1965).
204. Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 399 F.2d 121, 127 (9th Cir. 1968) (footnote
omitted).
205. Id. at 128.
206. Id. (footnote omitted).
207. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment k (1965). The Comment reads
in part:
Unavoidably unsafe products. There are some products which, in the present state
of human knowledge, are quite incapable of being made safe for their intended and
ordinary use. These are especially common in the field of drugs. An outstanding
example is the vaccine for the Pasteur treatment of rabies, which not uncommonly
leads to very serious and damaging consequences when it is injected. Since the
disease itself invariably leads to a dreadful death, both the marketing and the use
of the vaccine are fully justified, notwithstanding the unavoidably high degree of
200.
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ably unsafe products, and noted that strict liability is avoided with
such products only where their sale is accompanied by proper
warnings. The court stated that "in one sense, the lack of adequate
warning is what renders the product 'defective.' " 208 Full disclosure
of the existence and extent of the risk involved is part of the manufacturer's obligation in putting the product on the market. As soon
as the danger becomes apparent, a duty to warn attaches. The court
concluded that failure of the manufacturer to meet its duty to warn
"rendered the drug unfit in the sense that it was thereby rendered
unreasonably dangerous" with the result that "strict liability then
attached to its sale in absence of warning." 209 The Ninth Circuit
thus was able to find defendant liable despite the absence of any
clearly defective condition in the product by going behind the language of section 402A to reason from policies adduced from the
commentary to that section. In so doing, the court departed from
the explicit language of section 402A and effectively deleted the
requirement of defect in order to achieve a result consistent with its
perception of the core policies of strict liability.
It is reasoning such as this which leads to the crisis of confidence previously noted. 210 Lawyers in States where section 402A has
been incorporated expressly into tort law may not safely predict the
outcome of any given case since courts manifest such a marked
tendency to circumvent section 402A's articulation of the rule of
risk which they involve. Such a product properly prepared, and accompanied by
proper directions and warning, is not defective, nor is it unreasonably dangerous . . . .
Virus infected blood which transmits serum hepatitis presents a classic example of an
"unavoidably unsafe product." Almost all of the courts which have considered the problem
have rejected liability - the early decisions on the tenuous basis that a transfusion was a
"service" rather than a "sale" of blood and the more recent decisions, while admitting that
transfusion involved a product, on the basis that the danger was unavoidable. See, e.g.,
Sloneker v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 233 F. Supp. 105 (D. Colo. 1964); Hines v. St. Joseph's Hosp.,
86 N.M. 763, 527 P.2d 1075 (1974). This overwhelming majority position was departed from
in Cunningham v. MacNeal Memorial Hosp., 47 Ill. 2d. 443, 266 N.E.2d 897 (1970), where
the Illinois Court held that the "unavoidably unsafe" exception was inapplicable because
hepatitis inflected blood is "impure." Cunningham has been criticized severely by commentators and courts in other jurisdictions, and the Illinois legislature even passed legislation the
purpose of which was to reassert the validity of the "unavoidably unsafe products" exception.
See 1971 Ill. Laws, ch. 91, §§ 181-84 (renewed 1975 Ill. Legis. Serv. No. 4, at 778). The
Montana legislature has responded to this problem by declaring that furnishing and transfusion of blood is a service rather than a sale and by expressly precluding strict liability "for
injuries resulting from the furnishing or performing of such services." R.C.M. 1947, § 69-2203.
This statute only applies to blood supplied by a hospital, long-term care facility or doctor,
and does not preclude liability for blood banks if the blood bank has been negligent. R.C.M.
1947, 69-2204 (Supp. 1975). See also Hutchins v. Blood Services of Montana, 161 Mont. 359,
506 P.2d 449 (1973).
208. Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 399 F.2d 121, 129 n. 12 (9th Cir. 1968).
209. Id. at 130.
210. See discussion p. 223 supra.
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strict liability in favor of their perceptions of its underlying values,
even while speaking its language. This is not necessarily a negative
phenomenon, but it does mean that lawyers can no longer feel secure in relying solely on the language of section 402A. While section
402A may work quite well in those situations for which it was
drafted originally, it should be recognized for what it is. 211 It is a
foundation, a starting point, upon which the law can develop. But
it should not be permitted to restrict judicial expansion of the scope
of strict liability protection.
A solution to the linguistic problems of section 402A, and in
particular, the significance of the phrase ''defective condition unreasonbly dangerous," may be sought by examining the nature of
the liability imposed. Here strict liability must be contrasted with
liability based on negligence. Both derive from duties imposed by
tort law on a person's conduct when that conduct creates risks of
physical injury to other members of society and their property.
The distinction between strict liability and negligence is in the
conduct upon which the duty is imposed. In negligence, liability
results from the manufacturer's failure to exercise the care of a
reasonable person in making and marketing his products. In strict
liability, the manufacturer is liable not for failing to exercise due
care, but simply for "placing a product in the stream of trade in an
unreasonably dangerous defective condition." 212 In negligence,
breach is determined by application of the objective, reasonable
man standard, whereas in strict liability breach is based simply on
the actual sale in fact of the risk-creating product.
Keeping that distinction in mind aids examination and analysis of the language "defective condition unreasonably dangerous."
This language tends improperly to imply that the defective condition of the product constitutes the breach of the seller's duty. Dean
Leon Green has criticized the persistence of the idea that plaintiff
must prove a specific defect to show that the seller violated its duty.
He contends that this tendency has distorted the issues in a strict
liability case.
[I]t is the conduct of the seller· in placing the product ·in the
stream of trade to which the consumer's injury must be causally
. connected. Proof that the product was in a "defective condition
unreasonably dangerous to the user" establishes the violation of
211. The drafters originally intended section 402A to apply only to adulterated food and
drink, and thus much of the language of the section and accompanying commentary does not
readily conform to many of the varied fact situations in which the section is now being
invoked. It is to be expected then that courts often struggle with this section's twelve-yearold verbalization of a legal doctrine which was only nascent when the section was adopted.
212. Green, supra note 53, at 1200.
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duty that imposes liability. The proof of a specific defect is very
helpful, but it is not a requisite of a seller's liability . . . .
Since "defective" is only an adjective qualifying "condition," and
"defective condition" is only a qualifying phrase of unreasonably
dangerous, "dangerous" is the term of climactic importance in
characterizing the product. The singling out and isolation of
"defective" from its context distorts the conduct condemned. 213

The commentary to section 402A makes it clear that liability
is based upon the "special responsibility" a seller assumes "by marketing his product for use and consumption." 214 "Selling the product
in 'a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user' is the
violation of the seller's duty. The specific defect is only an evidentiary fact in the proof of the violation of the duty." 215 Or, as Dean
Keeton has described it: "[l]f the sale of a product is made under
circumstances that would subject someone to an unreasonable risk
in fact, liability for harm resulting from those risks should follow. " 216
Even though the "defective" condition of the product does not
constitute the breach of the seller's duty, the condition of the product in fact will determine whether the sale subjected anyone to an
unreasonable risk. Instead of impugning the conduct of the defendant-the defendant is strictly liable for his conduct-plaintiff
must impugn the product217 and show that it exposed him to unreasonable danger. How section 402A language applies in practice when
evaluating the dangerous condition of the product can be seen best
by establishing a framework based upon the specific deficiency of
the product in question. Product deficiencies are divided into two
categories: 1) products which are unsafe because of flaws in manufacturing or materials and, 2) products which are unsafe because of
faulty design. 218 Products with faulty designs are divided in turn into
213. Id. at 1207 (emphasis added). He notes that in a large number of cases a product
has been found to be in an unreasonably dangerous defective condition even though no
specific defect could be identified. Summers v. Interstate Tractor Equip. & Co., 466 F.2d 42
(9th Cir. 1972); Greco v. Bucciconi Eng'r. Co., 283 F. Supp. 978 (W.D. Pa. 1967), aff'd, 407
F.2d 87 (3d Cir. 1969); Alaska Rent-a-Car, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 526 P.2d 1136 (Alas. 1974);
Codling v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d 330, 298 N.E.2d 622, 345 N.Y.S.2d 461 (1973). Cf. Barich v.
Ottenstror, _Mont._, 550 P.2d 395, 398 (1976).
214. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) or TORTS § 402A, Comment c (1965).
215. Green, supra note 53, at 1207-08 (emphasis added).
216. Keeton, Product Liability-Inadequacy of Information, 48 TEx. L. REv. 398, 409
(1970).
217. Keeton, Products Liability and the Meaning of Defect, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 30, 33
(1973). "It is the unreasonableness of the condition of the product, not the conduct of the
defendant that creates liability." Jackson v. Coast Paint & Lacquer Co., 499 F.2d 809, 812
(9th Cir. 1974).
218. Many commentators have found a third category of product deficiencies: products
unsafe because of the manufacturer's failure to give adequate warnings about the use and
hazards of the product. See, e.g., Keeton, supra note 217, at 33-34; Wade, supra note 181, at
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the following subcategories: a) inadvertent design mistakes and, b)
conscious design choices. 219
2.

Manufacturing Defects

A manufacturing defect is an inadvertent and undetected imperfection or flaw in a particular unit of an otherwise acceptable run
of products. 220 Analysis of liability for injuries arising from this type
of defect falls most readily into the original Restatement scheme of
protection. The term "defect" most clearly applies to describe this
condition of the product. It is easier to show a flaw in the manufacture of the product than a defect in its design. 221 The plaintiff merely
must prove that the product was not manufactured according to the
standard intended by the manufacturer and that the flaw created
risk of harm. 222
Section 402A's qualifying term "unreasonably dangerous," will
be less important in this type of case, because the balancing which
inheres in the language of reasonableness usually will result in a
decision favorable to the plaintiff. 223 As Dean Keeton described the
manufacturing defect in Cronin:
Danger was reasonably foreseeable, and there was no redeeming
feature - no beneficial purpose to be served by having metal that
830, 841-42; Vetri, Products Liability: The Developing Framework for Analysis, 54 ORE. L.
REV. 293 (1975). The authors believe, however, that this category may be subsumed in most
cases into the second category of deficiencies in design, conscious design choice. See Phillips
v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Ore. 485, 525 P.2d 1033, 1035 (1974). Professor Vetri would appear
to recognize this dual categorization. In a footnote he stated that: "An inadequate warning
may be considered a design defect." Vetri, supra at 293 n.3. In a later article he says that
"[ w]aming deficiencies are in fact a particular species of design deficiency." Vetri, Products
Liability: The Prima Facie Case, 11 THE FORUM 1117, 1118 (1976). In that article, he adds a
fourth category of "indeterminate defects" to describe those situations where it is difficult to
pinpoint the exact nature of the defect and the design and manufacturing flaw categories tend
to merge. Id. at 1118-19.
219. The source of this subcategorization is Henderson, Judicial Review of Manufacturers' Conscious Design Choices: The Limits of Adjudication, 73 CoLUM. L. REv. 1531 (1973).
220. See examples cited note 186 supra and related discussion in text. Professor Wade
says that in manufacturing flaw cases the adjective "defective" is both meaningful and useful
in describing the product. Wade, supra note 181, at 841.
221. See id.
222. Vetri, Products Liability: The Prima Facie Case, supra note 218, at 1121; See also
Wade, supra note 199, at 14.
223. The holding in Cronin discussed 249-51 supra, abolishing the requirement that
the defective condition be "unreasonably dangerous", is supportable when it is a manufacturing defect which caused the plaintiff's injury. Evaluation of the unreasonableness of
the danger necessarily entails a balancing of the likelihood and gravity of the risk created
against the value or functional utility of the product as marketed. There is simply no
"reasonableness" in selling a product which does not even meet the design specifications of
the manufacturer if there is any substantial risk created by the defective condition of the
product. Therefore the risk - utility balancing will result almost automatically in a finding
that the flawed product was unreasonably dangerous.
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was porous, cm1taining holes, pits and voids. Therefore, the product was unreasonably dangerous as a matter of law and this would
be true of virtually any fabrication or construction defect. 224

Barich v. Ottenstror, 225 is the only manufacturing defect case
decided in Montana since Brandenburger. The court held that
plaintiff had the burden of showing that the alleged defect existed
when the product left the defendant's hands. Evidence presented
which showed that the product had been used extensively over two
years created a logical inference that the alleged defect in the product resulted from normal wear and tear, and plaintiff failed to overcome that inference. The court concluded that: "A manufacturer or
seller is not required, under the law, to produce or sell a product
that will never wear out." 226
The court discussed the condition of the product, a cardboard
wardrobe, primarily in terms of the language of defect. It repeated
the holding in Brandenburger that circumstantial evidence may be
used to draw inferences regarding the existence of the defect, and it
recognized that "a specific defect need not be shown where the
evidence tends to negate injury producing causes which do not relate to a defect . . . . " 227 Nonetheless, the language in the opinion
indicated that the court was not distinguishing between defect and
dangerousness in its analysis. The court, at one point, said that it
was well established that "in the absence of proof that the instrumentality in question was defective or dangerous" in the hands of
the defendant, there could be no liability. 228 In this case, and in most
manufacturing defect situations, this distinction is not important;
such a defect naturally will be unreasonably dangerous because
there is no utility which counterbaiances the risks created. 229 However, in design defect situations the bench and bar must remember
t,hat the term "unreasonably dangerous" is critical.
3.

Design Defects

A design defect is an error in design or marketing common to
all units in a given product run. Design defects resist categorization
under the defect language of section 402A because there is nothing
per se wrong with the product. In such instances, the concepts
"defective condition" and "unreasonable danger" merge; if the de224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.

Keeton, supra note 217, at 39 (emphasis added).
_Mont._, 550 P.2d 395 (1976).
Id. at 398.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
See discussion note 223 supra.
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sign created an unreasonable risk of danger, the product is also
defective. 230
Whether the design did create an unreasonable risk of danger
requires an evaluation of the design through a balancing of factors
which is often highly complex. The balancing process naturally resembles the balancing courts employ in determining whether given
conduct is negligent. 231 The difference is that in negligence, courts
examine the reasonableness of the defendant's actions, while in
strict liability, courts are evaluating the condition of an article
which is designed in a certain way. 232 "The article can have a degree
of dangerousness \vhich the la\v of strict liability will not tolerate
even though the actions of the designer were entirely reasonable in
view of what he knew at the time he planned and sold the manufactured article. " 233
Factors relevant to the balancing process for evaluating the
dangerousness of a product design have been enumerated by Dean
Wade and others. 23' In essence, the required balancing compares the
risks created by the design with its broad functional utility. Functional utility is a measure of how well the product does the task it
is intended to do. If the utility of the given design outweighs the
risks created, no liability can result because the product is deemed
not unreasonably dangerous.
How this balancing is effected depends upon which of two further .subclassifications of design defects-inadvertent design errors
or conscious design choices- 235 is at issue. The former refers to
230. See Vetri, Products Liability: The Developing Framework for Analysis, supra note
218, at 295 (citing Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Ore. 485, 525 P.2d 1033 (1974)). In
Jackson v. Coast Paint & Lacquer Co., 499 F.2d 809, 811 (9th Cir. 1974), the court said: "It
is not essential to strict liability that the [product] be defective in the sense that it was not
properly manufactured. If the product is unreasonably dangerous that is enough." See
generally Wade, supra note 181. Additional support for the proposition that the
"defectiveness" is determined by the danger is derived from the language of Comment g. See
note 197 supra.
231. The classic statement of balancing in the context of a negligence action is found
in Judge Hand's opinion in United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir.
1947). To evaluate the defendant's duty, it is necessary to balance (1) the probability that
an event will occur, (2) the gravity of the resulting injury if it does occur, and (3) the burden
of taking precautions.
232. See, e.g., Roach v. Kononen, 269 Ore. 457, 465, 525 P.2d 125, 129 (1974). See also
Green, supra note 53, at 1186.
233. Roach v. Kononen, 269 Ore. 457, 465, 525 P.2d 125, 129·(1974).
234. Wade, supra note 181, at 837-38, cited in Roach v. Kononen, 269 Ore. 457, 463-64,
525 P.2d 125, 128-29 (1974), and discussed critically in Vetri, Products Liability: The Developing Framework For Analysis, supra note 218, at 302-04.
235. These terms represent polar opposites. Most product designs will fall somewhere
between the two extremes. Their proximity to either extreme will affect the method of analysis that courts will be able to use in evaluating those designs to determine whether to impose
liability for risks created.
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"risks of harm which originate in the inadvertent failure of the
design engineer to appreciate adequately the implications of the
various elements of his design, or to employ commonly understood
and universally accepted engineering techniques to achieve the ends
intended with regard to the product. " 236 The latter refers to "risks
of harm which originate in the conscious decision of the design
engineer to accept the risks associated with the intended design in
exchange for increased benefits or reduced costs which the designer
believes justify conscious acceptance of the risks. " 237
This subclassification parallels that used by Professor Henderson, but the conclusion reached is different. Henderson argues that
adjudicative processes in general and courts in particular are not
well suited for independent review of design decisions and imposition of liability on manufacturers for those decisions. He says that
conscious design cases present issues which are too polycentric; 238
they involve courts in a very complex process of weighing multiple,
interdependent variables for which the courts are ill-equipped. 239
Henderson contends product design and safety standards should be
set by negotiation and managerial and administrative processes; 240
the safety of a product is only one factor among many which the
engineer has to consider in designing a product. Other interdependent and interrelated variables include price, utility, aesthetics,
marketability, and modes of production. 241 But, courts do not need
to engage in such polycentric decisionmaking to impose liability for
hazardous designs; they can make such determinations by engaging
in a simpler balancing analysis.

a.

Inadvertent Design Errors

Products having inadvertent design errors resemble those with
manufacturing flaws. In both, the product is not in the condition
Henderson, supra note 219, at 1548.
Id.
The term polycentric originated with Michael Polyani. M. PoLYANI, THE Lome OF
LIBERTY 170-84 (1951). It was borrowed by Professor Fuller who employed it in analyzing the
nature of the process of adjudication. See, e.g., Fuller, Adjudication and the Rule of Law,
1960 PROC. AM. Soc'v. INTI.. L. 1; Fuller, Collective Bargaining and the Arbitrator, 1963 Wis.
L. REv. 3. Professor Henderson, supra note 219, at 1536, describes the term as follows:
[P)olycentric problems are many centered problems, in which each point for decision is related to all others as are the strands of a spider web. If one strand is pulled,
a complex pattern of readjustments will occur throughout the entire web. If another
strand is pulled, the relationships among all the strands will again be readjusted.
A lawyer seeking to base his argument upon established principle and required
to address himself in discourse to each of a dozen strands, or issues, would find his
task frustratingly impossible.
239. Henderson, supra note 219, at 1539-42.
240. Id. at 1538, 1574-77.
241. See id. at 1540.
236.
237.
238.
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intended by the manufacturer, and the defect tends to defeat the
purpose for which the the product is manufactured. 242 Unlike conscious design choices where the inherent dangers of the design are
usually apparent, the dangers of inadvertent design errors and manufacturing flaws often are hidden from the user or consumer, as well
as the manufacturer. 243
As with manufacturing flaws, these characteristics of inadvertent design errors simplify the determination of dangerousness of
such products; for, as Professor Henderson has shown, courts faced
with inadvertent design error cases generally do not need to engage
in any compiicated, muitipie-factor baiancing to evaiuate the unreasonableness of the danger created by a manufacturer's chosen
design. 244 Courts have two means of judging the quality of products
placed on the market in these cases. First, the particular design
decision made by the manufacturer can be evaluated by comparing
it to externally developed, well-accepted standards of the government, industry, and the engineering profession, and thus, courts
need not test the condition of the product in a vacuum. 245 Secondly,
courts can balance the utility value, which is minimal or nonexistent because the product fails in its essential purpose, against
the risks actually created and thereby find the manufacturer liable
for having placed the unreasonably dangerous product on the market. Examples include airplanes that do not fly, 246 products that
explode 247 or collapse 248 during use, safety devices that malfunction, 249 and brakes that fail. 250
The facts in Knudson v. Edgewater Automative Division251 exemplify the type of situation where courts may readily impose strict
liability for inadvertent design error. Plaintiff, a mechanic, received
serious injuries when a roll pin, intended to keep an automotive jack
from over-extending, failed, causing a car to fall on him. The manu242. Id. at 1548.
243. Id. at 1549.
244. Id. at 1550.
245. Id.
246. See, e.g., Manos v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 324 F. Supp. 470 (N.D. Ill. 1971);
Noel v. United Aircraft Corp. 342 F.2d 232 (3d Cir. 1964).
247. See, e.g., Moore v. Jewel Tea Co., 46 Ill.2d 288, 263 N.E.2d 103 (1970) (can of drain
cleaner).
248. See, e.g., Knudson v. Edgewater Automotive Div., 157 Mont. 400, 486 P.2d 596
(1971) (automotive jack).
249. See, e.g., Rider v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 241 So.2d 61 (La. App.
1970) (safety belt latch).
250. See, e.g., Schield Bantum Co. v. Grief, 161 So.2d 266 (Fla. App. 1964).
251. 157 Mont. 400, 486 P.2d 596 (1971). Although based on negligence, the case demonstrates the type of fact situation which would be adjudicated easily on a theory of strict
liability.
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facturer designed the roll pin as a safety device, but testimony from
an engineer trained in analysis of stress on metals showed that the
pin was not designed to withstand stresses incurred during normal
use. The design of the jack, with that inadequate pin, thus made
the product "unreasonably dangerous. " 252
The jack as designed created unreasonable risks to unsuspecting users, and the inadequate size of the roll pin had no functional
utility to counterbalance those risks. The stress engineer testified·
that even a simple nail would have had greater utility and safety
than the roll pin chosen by the manufacturer. 253 Moreover, uncontradicted testimony of the stress engineer showed that the design of
the pin entirely failed to meet the standards of the engineering
profession. Thus, the court would have had no difficulty applying
the doctrine of strict liability in tort for defective design because the
risks clearly outweighed the utility of the product and the safety roll
pin failed to satisfy accepted engineering standards. This illustrates
both means courts may use in evaluating the dangerousness of the
product's design.
Similarly, in Brandenburger, the deficiency of the product arguably could be classified as inadvertent design error. The alleged
defect was in the design of the roof of a Toyota Land Cruiser which
was made 'of fiberglass and lacked reinforcing structural members.
Uncontradicted testimony of the plaintiff's expert engineer showed
that because of that design, "when a force, such as was applied
during the accident, hit the roof panel, the roof would not tend to
crumple, as in the case of a steel roof, but would simply blow up
and out, either shearing or pulling the rivets through the roof. " 254
The reinforcing members in a steel top would absorb the impact
energy of the blow to enable that kind of top to withstand greater
force than a fiberglass top. 255 The expert based his testimony on
inspection of tops of vehicles similar in functional utility to the
Toyota Land Cruiser. In evaluating the design of the top, the court
did not have to establish its own design standards in a vacuum, but
could look to relatively clear extrajudicial industry standards which
the Toyota failed to meet. Moreover, because the top as designed
failed in its essential protective purpose there was little utility value
in the design to counterbalance the risks created. Thus, the second
252. Id. at 405, 486 P.2d at 599.
253. Id.
254. Brandenburger v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 162 Mont. 506, 519, 513 P.2d
268, 276 (1973). An eyewitness testified that in tli.e actual accident the top "fl.ew up in the
air." Id. at 520, 513 P.2d at 276.
255. Id. at 519, 513 P.2d at 276.

1977)

PRODUCTS LIABILITY

261

approach to evaluating inadvertent designs also could apply to justify imposition of liability.
b.

Conscious Design Choices

Whereas inadvertent design errors often can be evaluated easily
because they are usually either self-defeating, in that the product
does not perform as intended, or deficient when measured by established standards of engineering, cases involving design decisions
consciously made by engineers cannot be resolved so simply. When
an engineer decides that a product \vill \vork better, cost less, and
sell more if it is designed a certain way, even though it may expose
some users to risk of injury, it is more difficult to label the product
unreasonably dangerous and thereby impose strict liability on the
manufacturer. In designing a product, the engineer may decide to
accept certain risks in exchange for increased functional utility or
decreased production costs. In such cases, the utility and cost values
of the chosen design may well counterbalance the risks created so
that it cannot be said that the dangers of the product are unreasonable.
Professor Henderson argues that courts and juries are not capable of evaluating such conscious designs, and he points to numerous
cases where courts have explicitly or implicitly recognized this incapacity.258 He proposes that standard setting and liability for dangerous designs which are the result of conscious choices should be left
to marketplace negotiations. 257 He maintains that only where the
risk created by the product is not obvious to the consumer and no
warnings about the risks have been given to the consumer should
the manufacturer be liable for any resultant injuries. 258
This argument ignores the principal policy reasons which were
the stimuli for adoption of strict liability in tort. 259 In the modern
national marketplace, consumer bargaining power is either minimal
or non-existent, and consumer decisions to purchase products are
256. Henderson, supra note 219, at 1560-62 nn. 123, 124, 126-29.
257. Id. at 1559-60. Reliance on marketplace negotiation means that if a manufacturer
consciously designs a product which creates risks to users in order to cut costs or increase
efficiency it must warn adequately of the dangers if those dangers are not apparent. The
consumer then may decide for himself what trade-offs he wants to make - whether to buy a
hazardous but cheaper product or buy a more expensive, safer one. Products which are
"unreasonably dangerous" will eventually be removed from the market because people will
choose not to buy them.
This thesis rests upon an unjustifiable and unrealistic conception of the modern marketplace. See discussion p. 262 infra. See also Keeton, supra note 216. Cf. Escola v. Coca Cola
Bottling Co., 24 Cal.2d 453, 467, 150 P.2d 436, 443 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring).
258. Henderson, supra note 219, at 1560.
259. See discussion pp. 247-48 supra.
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limited by a dearth of suitable alternatives, lack of information
about the product and individual financial constraints. 260 Even Professor Henderson acknowledges that in some cases the value of marketplace negotiation in protecting consumers decreases and that
courts will impose liability for conscious design decisions. 261 But,
other commentators have shown that this approach is highly unrealistic and partakes of warranty and contract concepts, not strict
liability in tort. 262 Any return to reliance on marketplace negotiation
to set standards to protect consumers from unsafe products substantially undercuts the policy foundations of strict liability in tort. 263
c.

Warnings

Courts are not wholly unequipped to evaluate conscious design
decisions; one way they make such evaluations is by determining
initially whether the manufacturer provided adequate warnings or
instructions regarding safe use of a product. If a manufacturer designs a product which exposes users to risk of injury and then fails
to warn users of the risks created, most courts have had little difficulty in imposing liability for the failure to warn. 264 In the context
of section 402A phraseology, the manufacturer may be deemed
strictly liable for placing the product on the market because, without adequate warnings, the product is unreasonably dangerous. As
in other design defect cases, when the manufacturer has failed to
warn of inherent dangers in its product, the "defectiveness" requirement of section 402A merges with the element "unreasonably dangerous."265 If a warning would have been effective in reducing the
260. Many courts have recognized these difficulties. In Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J.358, 161 A.2d 69, 83 (1960), Judge Francis described the modem marketplace:
Unqer modem conditions the ordinary layman, on responding to the importuning
of colorful advertising, has neither the opportunity nor the capacity to inspect or
to determine the fitness of an automobile for use; he must rely on the manufacturer
who has control of its construction, and to some degree on the dealer who, to the
limited extent called for by the manufacturer's instructions, inspects and services
it before delivery.
261. Henderson, supra note 219, at 1566-67.
262. Twerski, Donaher, Weinstein & Piehler, The Use and Abuse of Warnings in Products Liability - Design Defect Litigation Comes of Age, 61 CORNELL L. REv. 495, 513 n. 46
(1976).
263. See discussion pp. 247-48 supra.
264. Liability for negligent failure to warn of dangers associated with use of a product
is well established. See, e.g., Spruill v. Boyle-Midway, Inc., 308 F.2d 79 (4th Cir. 1962); Gall
v. Union Ice Co., 108 Cal. App.2d 303, 239 P.2d 48, 54 (1952); Tingey v. E. F. Houghton &
Co., 30 Cal.2d 97, 179 P.2d 807, 811 (1947). See generally Noel, Recent Trends in Manufacturers' Negligence as to Design, Instructions or Warnings, 19 Sw. L.J. 43 (1965); Dillard & Hart,
Product Liability: Directions for Use and the Duty to Warn, 41 VA. L. REv. 145 (1955).
265. Vetri, Products Liability: The Developing Framework for Analysis, supra note 218,
at 295.
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dangerousness of the product's design and no warning was given,
then the product is deemed unreasonably dangerous and a court
may avoid further evaluation of the chosen design by imposing liability solely for the failure to warn. By compelling manufacturers
effectively to inform users about potential hazards associated with
their products, courts may indirectly force off the market many
products which are dangerous to users and thus advance the overall
products liability goal of reducing the risks of injury to consumers. 266
The issue of liability for failure to warn, however, is not always
entirely straightforward. In certain instances, the presence or absence of warnings alone should not be determinative because the
warning might have little effect on reducing the risks created by use
of a product whereas economical, minor design changes would reduce substantially those risks. This is true despite comment j of
section 402A which seems to suggest that a warning alone may
insulate a product from being found unreasonably dangerous. 267 In
such warning cases, courts must engage in more complex analysis
of the relationship between the chosen design of the product and any
warnings given or omitted.
The first question courts must consider here is whether a warning would be effective. Where it is foreseeable that users who are too
young to understand a warning or casual bystanders will be exposed
to risks from the product, a warning may well have little value in
reducing the unreasonableness of the danger. 268 Furthermore, some
products may remain unreasonably dangerous because the user,
even with warnings, may not always be able to protect himself
against the risks created. 269 Warnings effectively reduce risks only
when users can be attentive to them. If there is a feasible design
modification which reduces the danger, the manufacturer should be
compelled to do more than just give a warning. 270 At this juncture,
266. In order to be effective, a warning may have to be extremely conspicuous and
describe in great detail the hazards of the product. When such a warning accompanies a
product, it will often deter consumption. See Twerski, Donaher, Weinstein & Piehler, supra
note 262, at 502-05.
267. The Comment states: "Where warning is given, the seller may reasonably assume
that it will be read and heeded; and a product bearing such a warning, which is safe for use
if it is followed, is not in defective condition, nor is it unreasonably dangerous." REsTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS§ 402A, Commentj (1965).
268. See, e.g., Dudley Sports Co. v. Schmitt, 151 Ind. App. 217, 279 N.E.2d 266 (1972)
(bystander injured by baseball pitching machine); McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., 278 Minn.
322, 154 N.W.2d 488 (1967) (infant burned when she overturned steam vaporizer).
269. In Patten v. Logemann Bros. Co., 263 Md. 364, 283 A.2d 567 (1971), the plaintiff
was injured when he tripped and inadvertently placed his hand into a lubrication and maintenance opening on a paper baling machine. The court denied recovery because the obviousness
of the danger constituted a warning to the plaintiff. However, under the circumstances, that
warning was clearly of little benefit to the plaintiff.
270. Thus in Patten, a very simple and inexpensive guard over the hole would have
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design evaluation necessarily merges with the warning issue. Just as
measurement of the unreasonableness of the danger of a product
requires a balancing of the risk created against the functional utility
of the design, the effectiveness of the warning must be balanced
against the feasibility of alternatives in design.
Although the mere presence of a warning should not preclude
automatically imposition of liability, its absence should not always
be the sole reason for finding the manufacturer liable. If a warning
regarding the use of a given product would be ineffective, then the
absence of a warning in that situation should be only one factor in
the court's evaluation of the dangerousness of the product. 271 Courts
in this situation should consider the unreasonableness of the design
itself, in light of feasible, safer alternatives.
Phillips v. Kim wood Machine Co., 272 a recent Oregon case,
demonstrates this tendency of courts to rely on the lack of warnings
as a basis for imposition of liability, despite the questionable effectiveness that a warning, if given, would have had. Plaintiff was
injured when a sanding machine which had not been readjusted
ejected a sheet of plywood which was slightly thinner than other
sheets which he had been feeding into the machine. The manufacturer had failed to warn of the danger of not readjusting the machine. Following an extensive, well-considered discussion of the
applicability of strict liability in a design defect case, the court
grounded liability on the basis that the machine was dangerously
defective due to the absence of a warning. The court said that it was
"therefore unnecessary for us to decide the questions that would
arise had adequate warnings been given. " 273
The court thus avoided inquiry into the effectiveness a warning
might have had, if given. If the differential in thickness of the sheets
was slight, would the operator have been able to detect the change
and take precautions? It may have been difficult to detect and, in
the environment of use of the machine, it would have been unreasonable to expect the operator to physically measure each sheet,
especially if the likelihood of a thin sheet becoming mixed with
thicker sheets was minimal. Moreover, evidence at trial indicated
that the manufacturer provided smaller models of similar machines
effectively eliminated the danger and would have prevented the plaintiff's injury. Id.
271. For instance, in Moran v. Faberge, Inc., 273 Md. 538, 332 A.2d 11 (1975), the court
found that because the cost of giving a warning was minimal, balancing that cost against the
risks of the product would "almost always weigh in favor of an obligation to warn of latent
dangers." Id. at 544, 332 A.2d at 15. This holding ignored the possibility that the warning
would have been ineffective to guard against the very remote risk in question.
272. 269 Ore. 485, 525 P.2d 1033 (1974).
273. Id. at 497, 525 P.2d at 1039.
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with an inexpensive safety device which prevented the type of occurrence which injured the plaintiff, that the plaintiff's employer
installed such devices on its machines after the accident, and that
the devices in no way reduced the efficiency of the machinery. 274
Therefore, on these facts, even if a warning had been given, the
court should not allow the manufacturer to avoid liability, for any
warning would have had limited effect, whereas slight design modificiations would have reduced greatly the inherent risks of the product.
Three federal cases dealing with product-related injuries suffered in the State of Montana illustrate the intricacies of reasoning
courts use to impose liability for failure to adequately warn consumers. The first, Davis u. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 275 is the most problematic. The plaintiff sued the manufacturer of Sabin Type ID polio
vaccine when, after taking the vaccine, .he contracted polio and
became paralyzed from the waist down. He grounded his claim in
negligence, failure to warn, strict liability in tort, and implied warranty. The court first rejected any claiin of migligent manufacture,
finding the product to be precisely what was intended. 278 The court
next decided that it was not necessary to distinguish between strict
liability in tort or in warranty because it felt the difference was
largely one of terminology. 277 The court stated explicitly that duty
to warn is a strict liability concept:
While appellant alleged negligent breach of a duty to warn as an
independent claim, we regard failure to warn, where the circumstances of sale imposed that duty, as exposing the vendor to trict
(sic) liability in tort . . . . 21s

At the outset, the Ninth Circuit adopted the reasoning of Dean
Wade, holding that liability may attach despite the lack of any
"impurity" in the product because "the true test in a case of this
kind is whether the product was unreasonably dangerous." 279
The court rejected the defendant's contention that the risk was
so trifling in comparison to the potential benefits that it should not
be found liable. It found instead that the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty to fully and effectively inform him of the risks involved
in taking the vaccine and that "the failure to meet this duty rendered the drug unfit in the sense that it was thereby rendered unrea274. Id. at 489, 525 P.2d at 1035.
275. 399 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1968).
276. Id. at 126.
277. Id.
278. Id. at 127.
279. Id. at 128 (footnote omitted).

266

MONTANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38

sonably dangerous." 280
Although the result appears fair and accords with the policies
of strict liability, one group of writers has pointed to a significant
deficiency in the court's reasoning. 281 The court decided that it was
the failure to warn which made the product "defective"; however,
even if there had been a warning, it would not have made the drug
any less dangerous to the user. A warning would not have reduced
the inherent incidence of risk in taking the drug, but would have
enabled the plaintiff to make an informed choice. Thus, the manufacturer's liability should be viewed under the rubric of informed
consent. By failing to inform the plaintiff of the probability of harm
in taking the drug and the probability of contracting polio without
the drug, the manufacturer did not obtain the plaintiff's informed
consent. 282 Nonetheless, the court's philosophy was sound when it
reasoned that failure to warn of inherent risks involved with use
could make a product unreasonably dangerous and thereby justify
imposition of strict liability.
The facts in the two other cases which followed Davis more
closely fit into the normal framework of strict liability for inadequate warnings. In Jacobson v. Colorado Fuel & Iron Corp., 283 the
court expressly relied on Davis, saying:
Davis distills the essence of the rule to be that the manufacturer
is under a duty to warn of dangers in "nondefective" but potentially harmful products . . . . [l]f the product is unreasonably
dangerous and a warning should be given but is not given, then the
product is automatically defective . . . .284

The court, however, found that the manufacturer had no duty to
warn the plaintiff's decedent if his supervisory personnel had sufficient knowledge of the danger. 285
The question of who must receive the warning was also of critical import in Jackson v. Coast Paint & Lacquer Co. 286 The plaintiff
in Jackson was using defendant's spray paint inside a railroad tank
car when the fumes ignited and severely burned him. The paint cans
280. Id. at 130.
281. Twerski, Donaher, Weinstein & Piehler, supra note 262, at 517-21.
282. Notably, the language in the opinion suggests that the court had merged the
principle of informed consent with the adequacy of warning issue. In discussing the manufacturer's duty to the consumer, the court said that no person should be obliged to submit
himself to experimentation with new drugs unless it is "by his voluntary and informed choice
or a choice made on his behalf by his physician." Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 399 F.2d
121, 129 (9th Cir. 1968) (emphasis added).
283. 409 F.2d 1263 (9th Cir. 1969).
284. Id. at 1271.
285. Id. at 1273.
286. 499 F.2d 809 (9th Cir. 1974).
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contained warnings to use the product with adequate ventilation,
but testimony at trial showed that the plaintiff and his coworkers
understood those warnings to mean that there was danger from
breathing toxic vapors, not from fire. 287 Other testimony indicated
that plaintiff's employers knew of the danger, and the defendant
relied on Jacobson for the proposition that a warning to the ultimate
user was unnecessary; but, the court distinguished Jacobson and
held that where a product such as paint would be used without
direction or supervision by technicians or engineers, the warning
must be given to the ultimate user. 288
Courts shouid attempt to decide any conscious design case by
initially evaluating the dangerousness of an otherwise unfiawed
product through analysis of the adequacies of any warnings given.
In so doing, courts must focus on the actual or potential effectiveness of the warning in light of the environment of use of the product,
the value of that warning in reducing the risks associated with use
of the product, and the feasibility of design modifications which
would reduce the risks without affecting functional utility of the
product. If resolution cannot be accomplished through this process,
courts must then engage in a somewhat more complicated balancing
process.

d.

Risk-Utility Balancing in Design Cases

Often the court ultimately is required to evaluate the relative
safety of the chosen design and the feasibility of safer alternatives.
When that occurs, the court must balance the risks created by the
particular design against the product's functional utility. 289 At that
point, Professor Henderson would preclude courts from adjudicating
the issue of the manufacturer's liability for marketing the product
with the particular design chosen. 290
Other commentators, however, have noted several reasons why
these questions still properly belong within the judicial bailiwick. 291
287. Id. at 811.
288. Id. at 812-14.
289. See, e.g., Bexiga v. Havir Mfg. Co., 60 N.J. 402, 290 A.2d 281 (1972). In Bexiga,
the plaintiff was injured when the ram of a punch press accidentally descended and hit his
hand. The plaintiff presented expert testimony which described two types of safety devices
which could have been incorporated into the machine. The court held:
[W]here there is an unreasonable risk of harm to the user of a machine which has
no protective safety device, as here, the jury may infer that the machine was
defective in design unless it finds that the incorporation by the manufacturer of a
safety device would render the machine unusable for its intended purpose.
Id. at 285.
290. See discussion pp. 258, 261-62 supra.
291. See Twerski, Donaher, Weinstein & Piehler, supra note 262, at 525-28.
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First, judicial evaluation of a conscious design focuses on one specific aspect of that design, safety. All other factors which an engineer uses in choosing the design, such as aesthetics, cost, and marketability, are secondary. The court "reexamines the design, taking
into account all the factors that the design engineer must account
for, with one difference: in this forum, they are viewed in light of
their ultimate impact on safety." 292
Second, courts are not actually setting design standards when
they evaluate the dangerousness of a product. Courts are not substituting their judgment for that of the engineer in choosing the precise
design that a product must have; they are only saying that the
design chosen is not good enough. They simply are deciding that the
product as so designed does not meet a minimum, reasonably acceptable level of safety. 293 One way for courts to make that type of
decision is to consider the feasibility of alternative designs. If feasible alternatives exist which would provide a greater level of safety
and which would have reduced the risks and prevented injury to the
plaintiff, without unreasonably affecting the functional utility of
the product, then the court should find that the manufacturer is
strictly liable for any injuries to users of the product. 294 At that
point, courts return to the balancing of risk versus utility which
inheres in the notion of unreasonable danger. When the functional
utility of the product would not be affected or would be only slightly
affected by safer alternative designs, then the manufacturer is
strictly liable for injuries to the consuming public which result from
placing such a product on the market. By contrast, in some rare
situations:
[T]he utility of the article may be so great, and the change of design necessary to alleviate the danger in question may so impair
the utility, that it is reasonable to market the product as it is,
even though the possibility of injury exists and was realized at the
time of the sale. 295

To fully effectuate this balancing, courts should consider the following factors among those enumerated by Dean Wade and recently
approved by the Oregon Supreme Court:
292. Id. at 527.
293. Id.
294. See, e.g., Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Ore. 485, 525 P.2d 1033 (1974),
discussed at pp. 264-65 supra; Bexiga v. Havir Mfg. Co., 60 N.J. 402, 290 A.2d 281 (1972),
discussed at note 289 supra.
295. Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Ore. 485, 525 P.2d 1033, 1038 (1974). In such
a case, the manufacturer would still be liable if it had not provided clear and conspicuous
warnings regarding the hazards of using the product, so that the consumer would know of
the risks and be able to take adequate precautions should he decide to encounter those risks.
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1) The usefulness and desirability of the product - its utility to
the user and to the public as a whole.
2) The safety aspects of the product - the likelihood that it will
cause injury and the probable seriousness of the injury.
3) The availability of a substitute product which would meet the
same need and not be as unsafe.
4) The manufacturer's ability to eliminate the unsafe character
of the product without impairing its usefulness or making it too
expensive to maintain its utility. 296
296. Roach v. Kononen, 269 Ore. 451, 464, 525 P.2d 125, 128 (1974) (citing \Vade, supra
note 181, at 837-38). The court and Dean Wade enumerate three other factors:
{5) The user's ability to avoid danger by the exercise of care in the use of the
product.
{6) The user's anticipated awareness of the dangers inherent in the product and
their avoidability, because of general public knowledge of the obvious condition of
the product, or of the existence of suitable warnings or instructions.
{7) The feasibility, on the part of the manufacturer, of spreading the loss by
setting the price of the product or carrying liability insurance.
The authors believe Professor Vetri's analysis of these three factors is correct. He criticizes
(5) because it rings of contributory negligence which is inappropriate in a strict liability case
and {6) because it suggests there is no liability for "patent" as opposed to "latent" dangers,
a doctrine which increasingly is being rejected by the courts. Factor {7) will determine
whether strict liability should be imposed on a particular manufacturer, but it should not be
part of the balancing to decide whether a given product is unreasonably dangerous. See Vetri,
Products Liability: The Developing Framework for Analysis, supra note 218, at 303-04 and
cases cited therein.
Professor Vetri recently proposed another balancing framework which complements
many of the principles set forth herein and which may be quite useful in evaluating the
dangers of a product:
Risk versus Feasibility of Risk Elimination Analysis (utility v. risk): Balancing of
Factors
a. Risk
{1) What risks of harm were created by the alleged unreasonably dangerous condition of the product?
{2) What is the probability of such risks causing harm?
{a) Analyze all of the circumstances concerning the likelihood of
occurrence of the harm including human nature and the tendency
of people to be careless on occasion.
{b) Consider the user's ability to avoid danger by the exercise of
care in the use of the product.
{c) Consider the user's anticipated awareness of the dangers in
the product and their avoidability, because of general public
knowledge of the obvious condition of the product or of the existence of suitable warnings or instructions.
{3) What is the gravity of the harm such risks could cause?
b. Feasibility of Risk Elimination
{l) Consider the availability of alternative products which would meet
the same need and not be as unsafe.
{2) Consider the manufacturer's ability to eliminate the unsafe character of the product without substantially impairing the product's usefulness or making it too expensive.
.
{3) Consider the social utility of the product ifthe alleged unreasonably
dangerous condition cannot be reasonably eliminated.
Vetri, Products Liability: The Prima Facie Case, supra, note 218, at 1132.
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Employing those factors, courts, without exceeding their intrinsic
capabilities, can measure whether a product presents unreasonable
danger and impose strict liability in tort on a manufacturer for
conscious design choices. 297

D.

Theories - Recommendations

Plaintiffs injured by unsafe products typically plead in the alternative three theories of recovery - warranty, negligence and strict
liability in tort. Because product-related injury litigation continues
to be relatively new and many issues remain unresolved, attorneys
are justifiably chary of relying on a single theory which they may
fail to prove at trial and with which a trial court judge might not
be familiar. Although justifiable, that reluctance should not inhibit
the bar from moving gradually to plead and prove a single cause of
action based on strict liability in tort for all physical injuries caused
by unsafe products. 298

1.

Warranty

Warranty liability is rooted in contract law. Thus, privity, disclaimers and required notice of breach under pre- and post-UCC
commercial law are often substantial obstacles to recovery. 299 Warranties, whether express or implied, depend upon some form of representation by the seller and expectation of reliance thereon by the
buyer. 300 As such, warranties work best when used to impose liability, in a commercial context, for inadequacies in bargained-for products; they function least effectively to provide injury reparation for
297. Courts have balanced risk against utility to determine the unreasonableness of the
dangerous condition of a given product in numerous cases. See, e.g., Borel v. Fibreboard
Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973); Dorsey v. Yoder Co., 331 F. Supp. 753 (E.D.
Pa. 1971); Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Ore. 485, 525 P.2d 1033 (1974); Roach v.
Kononen, 269 Ore. 457, 525 P.2d 125 (1974); Bexiga v. Havir Mfg. Co., 60 N .J. 402, 290 A.2d
281 (1972); Metal Window Prods. Co. v. Magnusen, 485 S.W.2d 355 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972);
Rivera v. Rockford Mach. & Tool Co., 1 Ill. App. 3d. 641, 274 N.E.2d 828 (1971); Pike v. Frank
G. Hough Co., 2 Cal.3d 465, 467 P.2d 229, 85 Cal. Rptr. 629 (1970).
298. See Green, supra note 53, at 1192. Dean Keeton says:
My principal thesis is and has been that theories of negligence should be avoided
altogether in the products liability area in order to simplify the law, and that ifthe
sale of a product is made under circumstances that would subject someone to an
unreasonable risk in fact, liability for harm resulting from those risks should follow.
Keeton, supra note 216, at 409. In Mather v. Caterpillar Tractor Corp., 23 Ariz. App. 409,
533 P.2d 717 (1975), the appellate court upheld the trial court's refusal to submit a products
case on both negligence and strict liability theories. The trial court had determined that the
negligence issue was superfluous and allowed only the strict liability issue to go to the jury.
Id. at 412, 533 P.2d at 719-20.
299. See discussion pp. 225, 240-41, 243-45 supra.
300. See discussion pp. 238-43, 245 supra.
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the remote user. 301
While language in part of the commentary of section 402A blurs
the distinctions between products liability in warranty and in tort, 302
Dean Prosser, Reporter for the Second Restatement, made it quite
clear that strict liability in tort under section 402A "is not subject
to the various contract rules which have grown up to surround [the
sale of goods]." 303 This blurring of liability in tort with language of
warranty and buyer expectations may be understandable in light of
the paucity of judicial decisions available to the drafters when they
wrote the section, but this warranty language in the commentary
should not be used to drag the baggage of warranty into a tort
action. 304 Unless the plaintiff is seeking recovery for economic loss
alone resulting from bargained-for, but inadequate, products, running the gauntlet of proving warranty will not avail plaintiff of
anything not already enjoyed under strict liability in tort. 305
2.

Negligence

There is considerable need to clarify the differences between
negligence and strict liability theories of recovery in product injury
litigation. Commentators and courts have described the similarities
between the elements of proof in, and the results of, products litigation under negligence and strict liability. 308 These similarities, how301. This is particularly critical in a state such as Montana in which the economy is
primarily oriented to agricultural and mineral resource development for external consumption and which, in turn, depends upon external manufacture of industrial products for internal use.
302. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 402A, Comments c and g (1965) (Comment c
speaks of consumer expectations, reliance and sellers standing behind their goods; Comment
g speaks of conditions "contemplated" by the consumer).
303. Id. Comment m.
304. See W. PROSSER, supra note 3, § 98, at 656-58. See also Greenman v. Yuba Power
Prods. Inc., 59 Cal.2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962).
305. The issue of recovery for purely economic loss under a theory of strict liability in
tort is beyond the scope of this article. Courts have disagreed over this issue. Compare Seely
v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal.2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965) with Santor v. A. &
M. Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965). The issue should depend upon the
relationship of the parties. If the parties have entered into a contractual relationship, then it
seems clear that warranty liability under the UCC should control. However, if the parties
are only remotely related and the consumer has suffered a loss for which he cannot recover
under a warranty theory, then on some facts, it may be appropriate to allow recovery under
strict liability. See Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal.2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 152-58, 45 Cal. Rptr.
17, 24-30 (1965) (Peters, J., concurring and dissenting). See also Brown v. Western Farmers
Assoc., 268 Ore. 470, 521 P.2d 537 (1974). When purely economic loss, such as lost profits, is
directly associated with injury to property or person, it seems fairly clear that courts will
have little difficulty in finding liability for the economic loss as well as the personal or
property damage. See Hales v. Green Colonial, Inc., 490 F.2d 1015, 1021-22 (8th Cir. 1974).
It is only when the purely economic loss is not tied to personal and property damage that
courts have struggled to resolve that issue.
306. See discussion and authorities cited pp. 230-32 supra.
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ever, engender confusion rather than confidence on the part of the
bench and bar when handling product cases. 307 Some courts simply
treat the concepts as indistinguishable, 308 while others treat each
distinctly and find error in jury instructions which tend to confuse
those issues. 309
Furthermore, the presence of a balancing process which inheres
in both the evaluation under a negligence theory of a manufacturer's
conduct pursuant to a reasonable person standard and evaluation
under a strict liability theory of a product pursuant to the unreasonable danger standard tends to encourage commingling of the concepts. 310 Balancing, however, is not a process which is exclusive to
negligence. For instance, under common law theories of tort liability
for abnormally dangerous activities, the courts use a balancing process to determine whether to impose liability for resultant injury. 311
It is the focus of the balancing process in a strict liability case which
distinguishes it from the balancing in a negligence case. In a strict
liability case the balance focuses on the dangerousness of the product, not the reasonableness of the manufacturer's conduct. 312 If the
product is unreasonably dangerous because of flaws in manufacture
or design, or because of inadequate warnings, the manufacturer is
strictly liable for his conduct in placing the product on the market;
the manufacturer's exercise of due care-a negligence concept-is
irrelevant. 313 As the Oregon Supreme Court noted in Roach v.
Kononen:
307. See discussion of Professor Kiely's thesis regarding the "crisis of confidence" in
products liability litigation, p. 223 supra.
308. See, e.g., Balido v. Improved Mach., Inc., 29 Cal. App.3d 633, 640, 105 Cal. Rptr.
890, 895 (1973).
309. See, e.g., Eshbach v. W. T. Grant's and Co., 481 F.2d 940, 944 (3d Cir. 1973); Lunt
v. Brady Mfg. Corp., 13 Ariz. App. 305, 307, 475 P.2d 964, 966 (1970). Cf. Pike v. Frank G.
Hough Co., 2 Cal.3d 465, 467 P.2d 229, 85 Cal. Rptr. 629 (1970) (negligence and strict liability
treated distinctly).
310. See discussion p. 257 supra.
311. See generally w. PROSSER, supra note 3, § 75, at 494·96; RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 520 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1964). Dean Wade also notes this analogy. Wade, supra
note 181, at 835-36.
312. Roach v. Kononen, 269 Ore. 457, 465, 525 P.2d 125, 129 (1974). See also Green,
supra note 53, at 1186, 1202-03.
313. The distinctions between recovery under negligence and under strict liability become clearer if one adopts the rule proposed by Dean Wade, supra note 181, at 834-35, and
Dean Keeton, supra note 216, at 404, 408. This rule imputes to the manufacturer in a strict
liability case knowledge of the dangerous condition of the product it is placing on the market.
Thus, "a greater burden is placed on the manufacturer . . . because the law assumes he has
knowledge of the article's dangerous propensity which he may not reasonably be expected to
have, had he been charged with negligence." Roach v. Kononen, 269 Ore. 457, 465, 525 P.2d
125, 129 (1974). That rule has been utilized by courts in many jurisdictions. E.g., Reyes v.
Wyeth Laboratories, 498 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir. 1974); Welch v. Outboard Marine Corp., 481 F.2d
252 (5th Cir. 1973); Dorsey v. Yoder Co., 331 F. Supp. 753 (E.D. Pa. 1971). Full discussion of
this rule may be found in Vetri, Products Liability: The Deueloping Framework for Analysis,
supra note 218, at 296-302.
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The article can have a degree of dangerousness which the law
of strict liability will not tolerate even though the actions of the
designer were entirely reasonable in view of what he knew at
the time he planned and sold the manufactured article. 314
3.

Strict Liability

Plaintiffs should endeavor to plead and prove their cases in
strict liability alone. Pleading both theories may have practical consequences which make recovery under strict liability less likely.
Pleading negligence in addition to strict liability permits the defendant to introduce a barrage of evidence showing its exercise of due
care and its careful and prudent manufacture and allows it to prove
any of the traditional negligence defenses. Under the onslaught of
due care evidence, juries may not be able to separate plaintiff's
theories and may not understand fully that due care and negligence
defenses are relevant to one claim and not to the other. Therefore,
juries may base a verdict for the defendant manufacturer on its
showing of due care or contributory negligence even though the
plaintiff had proved a strict liability case. The effective result may
be that a strict liability action is subjected to the rules and limitations of a negligence action. 315
Admittedly, if there is substantial evidence of fault on the part
of the manufacturer, plaintiffs' attorneys may justifiably believe
that they will be able to obtain larger jury awards if they plead and
prove negligence as well as strict liability. Moreover, pleading strict
liability alone exposes the plaintiff to the risk that trial judges inexperienced in products litigation may improperly permit introduction of irrelevant evidence of due care. That error may result in
verdicts for defendant manufacturers despite clear liability under a
strict liability theory. Furthermore, judges who have had little exposure to strict liability may improperly dismiss on technical grounds
cases brought solely on that new theory.
Given these very real risks today, plaintiffs' attorneys may conclude that alternative pleading is still the best practice. In the future, however, they should attempt to educate themselves and the
rest of the bar in the policies and elements of strict liability in tort.
Plaintiffs' attorneys should consider pleading a single claim under
strict liability and then submit to the court a motion in limine316 to
314. 269 Ore. 457, 465, 525 P.2d 125, 129 (1974) (emphasis added).
315. Green, supra note 53, at 1212, (citing Hauter v. Zogarts, 14 Cal.3d 104, 534 P.2d
377, 120 Cal. Rptr. 681 (1975) (appellate court upheld judgment for plaintiff notwithstanding
jury verdict for defendant)).
316. A motion in limine is a threshold or preliminary motion to exclude evidentiary
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preclude submission of evidence of due care or contributory negligence at trial. If that motion is denied by the trial judge, counsel
must petition the supreme court for a writ of supervisory control to
clarify the issue. 317 If that fails, the trial court should permit the
plaintiff to amend his pleadings to add a claim in negligence. 318
Hopefully, clear and concise direction from the supreme court will
make use of these procedures unnecessary.
III.

OTHER IMPORTANT STRICT LIABILITY ISSUES

Apart from this general conceptual framework for analyzing
strict liability cases, there are other, less crucial, but still important,
issues which arise in strict liability litigation. The following group
of issues selected for discussion is not meant to be all-inclusive but
rather is intended to highlight problems which counsel frequently
encounter. The goal is to alert the bench and bar to these issues as
areas of potential controversy and to suggest ways to resolve them,
not to analyze them in depth.

A.

Comparative Negligence and Strict Liability

Two years after judicial adoption of strict liability under section 402A, 319 the legislature further altered the course of tort litigation in Montana by adopting a modified form of comparative negligence.320 The statute changed the harsh common law doctrine of
contributory negligence, providing that negligence of the person
seeking relief will not bar recovery if such negligence is not greater
than the negligence of the person against whom recovery is sought. 321
Under the statute, the plaintiff's damages are simply diminished in
proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to him. 322 One
unresolved question, however, is whether the legislative policy of
comparative negligence should apply to the judicial doctrine of
strict liability in tort.
Section 402A commentary eliminates some forms of contributory
negligence as defenses to a strict liability claim for relief because
material "which might, by its mere mention, result in prejudice on the part of the jury." Note,
The Motion in Limine - A Useful Procedural Device, 35 MONT. L. REV. 362 (1974).
317. Rule 17, MONT. R. APP. C1v. P.
318. Rule 15, MoNT. R. C1v. P. (providing for amendment by leave of court to be
"(f]reely given when justice so requires.")
319. Brandenburger v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 162 Mont. 506, 513 P.2d 268
(1973).
320. 175 Mont. Laws, ch. 60, § 1 (codified at R.C.M. 1947, § 58-607.1 (Supp. 1975)).
321. R.C.M. 1947, § 58-607.1 (Supp. 1975).
322. Id.
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"the liability with which this Section deals is not based upon negligence of the seller . . . . " 323 Thus it would seem to follow logically
that a defense grounded in negligence - whether contributory negligence or comparative negligence - should have no application in a
section 402A action. The few courts which have dealt with the issue,
however, have not agreed on the effect that a comparative negligence statute will have on strict liability claims. 324
Courts which have applied comparative negligence to strict liability actions have advanced different theories to support that application. A federal court in New Hampshire reasoned that because the
state supreme court previously had allowed contributory negligence
as a complete defense in strict liability actions, it also would apply
the State's new comparative negligence statute to such actions. 325
The Wisconsin Supreme Court decided that a strict liability action was, in effect, a negligence action. 326 The court could ascertain
no meaningful distinction between liability imposed for violation of
a legislative safety standard and liability imposed for violation of a
court-adopted rule of strict liability; both violations constituted
negligence per se. 327 Thus, the court held that a negligence defense
based on the State's comparative negligence statute was still available to ~he defendant. 328 The court explained that it had adopted
strict liability to relieve plaintiffs of the difficult burden of proving
specific acts of negligence and to preclude defenses related to war323. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment n (1965).
324. Four States have applied, or have indicated in dicta that they will apply, comparative negligence in strict liability cases: Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis.2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55, 6465 (1967); Haneyv. International Harvester Co., 294 Minn. 375, 201N.W.2d140 (1972); West
v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So.2d 80, 90 (Fla. 1976); Butaud v. Suburban Marine &
Sporting Goods, Inc., 555 P.2d 42, 43 (Alas. 1976).
Federal courts, interpreting state law, have decided that the supreme courts of four
additional States will apply comparative negligence in strict products liability cases: Chapman v. Brown, 198 F. Supp. 78, 85 (D. Hawaii 1961), aff'd, 304 F.2d 149 (9th Cir. 1962);
Hagenbuch v. Snap'On Tools Corp., 339 F. Supp. 676-83 (D. N.H. 1972); Sun Valley Airlines,
Inc. v. Avco-Lycoming Corp., 411 F. Supp. 598 (D. Idaho 1976); Edwards v. Sears, Roebuck
& Co., 512 F.2d 276, 290 (5th Cir. 1975) (interpreting Mississippi law).
Courts in two States have stated that comparative negligence does not apply in strict
liability cases: Kirkland v. General Motors Corp., 521P.2d1353, 1367 (Okla. 1974); Kinard
v. Coats Co., 553 P.2d 835, 837 (Colo. App. 1976). The Supreme Court of California, without
directly addressing the issue of the comparative negligence defense, has indicated that comparative negligence will not be applied under California's judicially created strict liability
doctrine. Hom v. General Motors Corp., 131 Cal. Rptr. 78, 551 P.2d 398, 403 (1976). Yet
another comparative negligence jurisdiction stated flatly that negligence defenses have no
application to strict liability, but, like the California court, spoke in terms of contributory
rather than comparative negligence. Parzini v. Center Chemical Co., 134 Ga. App. 414, 214
S.E.2d 700, 702 rev'd on other grounds, 234 Ga. 868, 218 S.E.2d 580 (1975).
325. Hagenbuch v. Snap-On Tools, 339 F. Supp. 676, 683 (D. N.H. 1972).
326. Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis.2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967).
327. Id. at 64-65.
328. Id.
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ranty theories of liability; it had not intended to impose absolute
liability or to make the seller an insurer. 329
The Alaska Supreme Court applied comparative negligence to a
strict liability case to distribute the losses between the parties, making the seller strictly liable, but not for the damage which the plaintiff caused through .his own negligence. 330 The court decided that
applying comparative negligence in a strict liability action would be
logical and consistent with the law of products liability. The plaintiff should not be allowed to recover full damages in a strict liability
action when he would recover less in a negligence action based on
the same injuries from the same product. 331
The courts which have refused to apply comparative negligence
in strict liability cases have based refusal on interpretation of the
language of the particular State's comparative negligence legislation, in light of the language and policies of section 402A. The Oklahoma Supreme Court rejected the manufacturer's contention that
comparative negligence should apply, saying that the state statute
"has no application to manufacturers' products liability, for its
application is specifically limited to negligence actions . . . manufacturers' products liability is not negligence . . . . " 332 The Colorado
Court of Appeals similarly reasoned that: "Products liability under
section 402A does not rest upon negligence principles . . . the focus
is upon the nature of the product . . . rather than on the conduct
either of the manufacturer or of the person injured because of the
product. " 333
This latter approach to comparative negligence is more persuasive; statutory comparative negligence has no place in a strict liability action for product injuries. In Montana, this view is supported
by the core philosophy underlying judicial adoption of strict liability, the practical consequences of allowing negligence-based defenses, and the legislative history of the State's comparative negligence statute.
In Brandenburger, the Montana Supreme Court made it clear
that the policies of diverting the risk of loss from the individual
consumer to the manufacturer and deterring the introduction of
dangerous products in the market underlay adoption of section 402A
329. Id. at 63. The rationale for adoption of strict liability in Montana is clearly distinguishable. Brandenburger v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 162 Mont. 506, 514-15, 513
P.2d 268, 273 (1973). See discussion p. 277 & note 334 infra.·
330. Butaud v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc., 555 P.2d 42, 46 (Alas. 1976).
331. Id. This holding also ignores the policy reasons such as risk spreading and deterrence which make a strict liability case distinct from a negligence case.
332. Kirkland v. General Motors Corp., 521 P.2d 1353, 1367 (Okla. 1974).
333. Kinard v. Coats Co., 553 P.2d 835, 837 (Colo. App. 1976).
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as the rule of law in this State. 334 Using comparative negligence to
limit damages recoverable by the plaintiff would burden the individual with the loss even though the manufacturer initially created
the risk of injury to the plaintiff by marketing the dangerous product and also would reduce the deterrence value of section 402A. The
Restatement imposes strict liability for the sale of the product
which injuries the plaintiff. It is the manufacturer's risk-creating
conduct which exposed the plaintiff to danger; if the product had
never been placed on the market the plaintiff never would have
encountered the risk. The manufacturer should pay the cost of
plaintiff's injuries because its activity exposed him to the risks and
it received the economic benefits of the activity.
Moreover, application of comparative negligence principles to
reduce plaintiff's recovery in a strict liability action_ will have serious practical consequences in the trial of a strict liability action.
Introduction of evidence of negligence and due care in a strict liability case will tend to confuse the issue of the manufacturer's liability. 335 Under section 402A, the manufacturer is liable for the sale of
a defective, dangerous product; presence or absence of due care is
not a factor in the imposition of liability. The manufacturer may be
entirely free from negligence, yet still be liable. But, if comparative
negligence principles were to apply, the jury in some instances
would be asked to balance the negligent conduct of the plaintiff
against conduct of the defendant which is not characterized as negligent. If the plaintiff has been even slightly careless in using the
product, he will be forced to show negligence on the part of the
manufacturer to counterbalance his own negligence. The likely result will be jury denial of full recovery, even though the manufacturer's due care should not otherwise insulate it from liability under
section 402A. Comparison of the negligence of the manufacturer to
the negligence of the plaintiff would reduce strict liability to a mere
form of words and would result in improper denial of numerous
claims.
Finally, the Montana comparative negligence statute speaks only
to negligence claims; applying it to a strict liability action would
require exceedingly strained judicial construction and would contravene the intent of the legislature. A bill making the comparative
negligence statute applicable to torts of strict liability and clarifying
other areas of tort law was introduced in the 1977 legislature. 338
334. Brandenburger v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 162 Mont. 506, 514, 513 P.2d
268, 273 (1973).
335. See discussion pp. 271-74 supra.
336. H.R. 320, 45th Legis. (1977). [After this article was written, H.R. 320 was passed
and signed by the Governor.-Ed.]
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Although the bill in modified form has passed the House and is
presently in the Senate where it appears likely to pass and become
law, the crucial section making comparative negligence applicable
to strict liability was deleted from the bill before it passed the
House. 337 This confirms that the legislature in adopting comparative
negligence did not intend it to apply to non-negligence torts such
as strict liability under section 402A. If the legislature had intended
it to so apply, it would have retained that language in the present
bill to clarify its intent in passing the original legislation. 338
B.

Strict Liability Defenses

Although judges and attorneys should not be allowed to use
comparative negligence to reduce the plaintiff's recovery in strict
liability, the defendant manufacturer is not without defenses to the
337. . Before it was deleted the section read: "For the purposes of this act, 'negligence'
includes torts of strict liability and breach of warranty to the extent that they would, apart
from 58-607.1, give rise to the defense of contributory negligence." H.R. 320, 45th Legis. § 5
(1977).
338. One commentator has argued that comparative negligence is consistent with the
risk spreading rationale of strict liability because it "allows a just and simple way of placing
a part of the cost where it belongs - on the individual plaintiff." Schwartz, Strict Liability
And Comparative Negligence, 42 TENN. L. REv. 171, 179 (1974). Professor Schwartz would
have courts in States with comparative negligence statutes adopt a pure form of comparative
negligence as part of the State's common law. Id. at 180. That approach still downgrades the
practical consequences of requiring the jury to consider the plaintiff's conduct in awarding
damages. It is like comparing apples and oranges to compare plaintiff's fault to the conduct
of the defendant in which fault is irrelevant. Dean Green, however, takes the position that
even though liability is strict and not subject to comparison of fault, there still may be reason
to reduce damage awards on the grounds of the common law rule of avoidable consequences.
That rule does not create a defense; instead, it is a rule of damages whereby plaintiff's
recovery is precluded for those items of damages which could reasonably have been averted
by him. Green, supra note 53, at 1216-17 (citing C. McCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF
DAMAGES, § 33, at 129 (1935)). The authors, nonetheless, believe that requiring juries to
consider plaintiff's conduct may result in improper denial of recovery because it will require
introduction of otherwise irrelevant and extraneous evidence which will confuse the central
issue of liability.
Under the Restatement framework for strict liability, contributory negligence is no defense, whereas assumption of risk is. See discussion pp. 279-82 infra. One strong argument
for using a comparative negligence rule is that it will allow plaintiffs to recover even when
they have assumed the risk of using the dangerous product. Proponents argue that it would
be anomalous to allow some recovery in negligence (reduced by risk assumed) and yet deny
all recovery under strict liability. See Vetri, Products Liability: The Prima Facie Case, supra
note 218, at 1127, accord, Vetri, Products Liability: The Developing Framework for Analysis,
.~upra, note 218, at 314 n. 99. This argument is consistent with the notion that the defendant
should be held liable for having placed the risk-creating production on the market. See
discussion pp. 247, 253-55 supra. However, it does not match the position taken regarding
the practical consequences of trying a products case under a comparative negligence rule. For
that reason, the authors advocate continued reliance on the Restatement framework of defenses to a strict liability claim, while carefully limiting the applicability of the assumption of
risk defense. See discussion pp. 280-82 infra.
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plaintiff's claim. Certain conduct of the plaintiff may defeat recovery. The section 402A commentary provides a starting point for
discussion of these defenses.
1.

Contributory Negligence

Comment n of section 402A states flatly: "[C]ontributory negligence . . . is not a defense when such negligence consists merely
in a failure to discover the defect . . . or to guard against the possibility of its existence." 339 Under that view, plaintiff's failure to exercise the due care required by the objective standard of the reasonably prudent person does not bar recovery and plaintiff is not required to affirmatively plead exercise of due care. 340 The overwhelming majority of jurisdictions that have adopted strict liability for
defective products has followed that rule; only two jurisdictions
have not. 341
Contributory negligence was not considered in either
Brandenburger or Barich, and thus, it is unclear whether the Restatement view will be followed. 342 However, two federal cases aris339. ~ESTATEMENT (SECOND) or TORTS § 402A, Comment n (1965) (emphasis added).
340. See Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co., 45 Ill.2d 418, 261 N .E.2d 305, 309·10 (1970) (in a
strict liability case a greater degree of culpability, amounting to assumption of risk, is necessary to preclude recovery).
341. See Noel, Defective Products: Abnormal Use, Contributory Negligence, and Assumption of Risk, 25 VAND. L. REV. 93, 107-08 (1972) (citing Stephan v. Sears, Roebuck &
Co., 110 N.H. 248, 266 A.2d 855 (1970), and Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis.2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55
(1967), as the two exceptions).
342. It should be noted that in Oltz v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 166 Mont. 217,
531P.2d1341 (1975), the court did deal with the issue of contributory negligence in a strict
liability case. The court decided that the driver of the Toyota which crashed and killed the
plaintiff's decedent in Brandenburger was barred from recovery by the prior jury finding that
he had been grossly negligent in operating the vehicle.
Thus, contributory negligence may be available as a defense in those limited situations
where the person seeking recovery operated the vehicle in a grossly negligent manner and the
defective condition of the vehicle played no part in the original collision, but merely enhanced
the subsequent injuries. Id. at 220, 531 P.2d at 1343.
Beyond the limited applicability of this holding, there is considerable ground for questioning the reasoning and authority the court used in reaching its decision. Justice Castles
said that the court had examined the authorities cited by both parties before deciding;.
however, neither of the cases cited in the opinion in any way supports the decision reached.
The first, Adams v. Ford Motor Co., 103 Ill. App.2d 356, 243 N.E.2d 843 (1968), was a lower
appellate court opinion which had been effectively overruled by the Illinois Supreme Court
nearly five years before the Oltz decision. In Adams, the court relied on an earlier opinion
which was specifically reversed by the supreme court in Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co., 45 Ill.2d
418, 261 N.E.2d 305 (1970).
The second case relied on, General Motors Corp. v. Walden, 406 F.2d 606 (10th Cir.
1969), did not even involve second collision liability or the defense of contributory negligence.
At trial the plaintiff had recovered a substantial judgment against the manufacturer and on
appeal the judgment was affirmed. The trial court had given certain instructions regarding
the negligence of the plaintiff as a defense, but the appellate court made it clear that the
instructions dealt with misuse of the product, not contributory negligence. Id. at 680. But cf.
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ing in Montana will provide guidance for the supreme court when
it first confronts the issue. 343 In each case, the Restatement view was
not questioned; plaintiff's carelessness would preclude recovery only
if it consisted of voluntarily embracing known dangers, not mere
failure to exercise the objective standard of due care. 344

2.

Assumption of Risk

Some forms of conduct on the part of the plaintiff may defeat
his strict liability claim. Comment n of section 402A points to the
kind of conduct which will prevent recovery: "[C]ontributory negligence which consists in voluntarily and unreasonably proceeding
to encounter a known danger, and commonly passes under the name
of assumption of risk, is a defense under this Section as in other
cases of strict liability." 345 Whereas the standard for the contributory negligence which is no defense is objective, the standard for
assumption of risk, which is a defense, is subjective and requires
that plaintiff use the product after acquiring actual knowledge of its
dangers. 346
Whether the plaintiff's conduct demonstrates that he did assume
the risk will depend on a variety of factors. The plaintiff must know
the facts that create the danger and must comprehend the danger; 347
his age, experience, and intelligence must be considered. 348 Most
courts require the defendant to prove that the plaintiff actually
.Jacobson v. Colorado Fuel & Iron Corp., 409 F.2d 1263 (9th Cir. 1969) (holding that wher~
the product will be used under the supervision of the employer, the manufacturer will not be
liable to the employer for failure to warn).
343. Jackson v. Coast Paint & Lacquer Co., 499 F.2d 809 (9th Cir. 1974); Tomicich v.
Western-Knapp Eng'r, Co., 423 F.2d 410 (9th Cir. 1970). Federal cases treating fact situations arising in Montana are often looked to for guidance by the Montana Supreme Court if
the court has not previously decided a particular issue. For example, in Brandenburger v.
Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 162 Mont. 506, 512-13, 513 P.2d 268, 272 (1973), the court
noted that in Hornung v. Richardson-Merrill [sic], Inc., 317 F. Supp. 183 (D. Mont. 1970),
and Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 399 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1968), federal courts had
anticipated eventual adoption of strict liability as the law of the state.
344. Jackson v. Coast Paint & Lacquer Co., 499 F.2d 809, 814-15 (9th Cir. 1974) (specifically citing with approval Comment n and holding that contributory negligence would bar
recovery only if plaintiff was aware of and unreasonably embraced the danger); Tomicich v.
Western-Knapp Eng'r Co., 423 F.2d 410, 413 (9th Cir. 1970) (denying recovery because· of
voluntary exposure to known danger).
345. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment n (1965) (emphasis added).
346. Noel, supra note 341, at 121-22; REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496D, Comment c (1965). See also Jackson v. Coast Paint & Lacquer Co., 499 F.2d 809, 815 (9th Cir.
1974); D'Hooge v. McCann, 151 Mont. 353, 443 P.2d 747 (1968).
347. Id. See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 3, § 68, at 447; cf. Hanson v. Colgrove,
152 Mont. 161, 447 P.2d 486 (1968).
348. See, e.g., Saeter v. Harley-Davidson Motor Co., 186 Cal. App. 2d 248, 8 Cal. Rptr.
747 (1960) (twenty-eight year old plaintiff with six years of experience riding motorcycles
brought an action for injury from defective motorcycle).
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realized the danger; but, because it sometimes may be impossible
to prove actual knowledge, some courts will permit proof by circumstantial evidence that the plaintiff "should have been aware" of the
risk in view of all the circumstances. 349 However, a recent Ninth
Circuit case arising on appeal from a Montana district court,
Jackson v. Coast Paint & Lacquer Co., 350 held that the knowledge
of the plaintiff's employer will not be imputed to the plaintiff and
required that the defendant show that the actual user of the product
understood the product's hazards and voluntarily assumed the
risk. 351
Even if the risk is known, plaintiff does not assume it unless his
decision is entirely free and voluntary. Thus, although an employee
who fully appreciates the danger of a defective machine may be
compelled to encounter that risk if he desires to keep his job, the
manufacturer should not be relieved of liability if the employee later
is inadvertently injured by the product. 352 Similarly, because of time
constraints or other pressures such as the unavailability of alternative products, the plaintiff's decision to use a product he knows is
dangerous may not be wholly voluntary. 353
Moreover, insulation of the manufacturer from liability seems
questioqable when the manufacturer markets a product having
open and obvious dangers which may be eliminated economically
and to which the user cannot always be attentive. 354 Obvious dan349. Downey v. Moore's Time-Saving Equip., Inc., 432 F.2d 1088, 1093 (7th Cir. 1970);
Bereman v. Burdolski, 204 Kan. 162, 164, 460 P.2d 567, 569 (1969).
350. 499 F.2d 809 (9th Cir. 1974).
351. Id. at 815.
352. Thus, in Elder v. Crawley Book Mach. Co., 441 F.2d 771 (3d Cir. 1971), the court
properly rejected the defendant's contention that the plaintiff had "voluntarily" placed her
fingers in such a position that they were severed by the machine. The court concluded that
"if the plaintiff's fingers became placed in a dangerous position in the machine by reason of
inadvertence, momentary inattention or diversion of attention, that this would not amount
to assumption of the risk." Id. at 774.
353. Professor Vetri emphasizes the additional requirement that the plaintiff's conduct
in assuming the risk be "unreasonable" as well as knowing and voluntary. Vetri, Products
Liability: The Prima Facie Case, supra note 218, at 1125. This requirement accords with the
proposition that assumption of the risk should be available only in those limited circumstances when it is clear the plaintiff knowingly decided to encounter a risk with little or no
necessity or compulsion to do so. It also comports with the literal language of Comment n.
354. A traditional limitation on a manufacturer's liability has been that he is not liable
for open and obvious dangers when it can reasonably be presumed that the user was familiar
with the risks of the using the product. W. PRosSER, supra note 3, § 96, at 649. See, e.g.,
Scheme! v. General Motors Corp., 384 F.2d 802 (7th Cir. 1967); Campo v. Scofield, 301 N.Y.
468, 95 N.E.2d 802 (1950). But, that rule frequently has been criticized and, in the context
of a strict liability cause of action, may have limited applicability. See Keeton, supra note
216, at 399-405; Wade, supra note 181, at 842-43. Dean Wade notes that the rule may be viable
for products such as cigarettes and alcohol where the consumer freely accepts unavoidable
dangers to his own person and for products such as hoes or axes where the dangers in use
inhere in the utility of the product, but he is critical of the rule where the obvious dangers of
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gers are analogous to warnings. Warnings are not always an effective
means of reducing product risk, consequently manufacturers may
be forced to make design alterations as well as to give warnings in
order to reduce the unreasonable dangerousness of their products. 355
Just as warnings alone do not preclude liability for defective designs, marketing products with patent hazards should not relieve
the manufacturer from liability if inexpensive safety features could
be provided to reduce those hazards. 356 In a design defect case the
defense of assumption of risk arguably should be severely restricted;
allowing that defense in such cases contravenes the policy of encouraging manufacturers to change hazardous designs.

C.

Foreseeability, Intended Use, and Abnormal Use

The use to which the plaintiff put the product must have been
reasonably foreseeable by the manufacturer. Unforeseeable use
which results in injury to the plaintiff may preclude plaintiff's recovery because the product was not in an unreasonably dangerous
defective condition, or under some circumstances, it may mean that
plaintiff assumed the risk of such use.
Early in the development of strict liability under section 402A,
courts relied on the doctrine of intended use to limit the range of
risks for which a manufacturer might be held responsible. 357
the product could have been eliminated. The first question in those latter cases should be
whether the product was unreasonably dangerous as sold-whether the utility of the product
as designed outweighed the risks created by the design. See, e.g., Luque v. McLean, 8 Cal.3d
136, 501 P.2d 1163, 104 Cal. Rptr. 443 (1972) (rejecting instruction which required plaintiff
to carry burden of showing that defect was not obvious); Pike v. Frank G. Hough Co., 2 Cal.3d
465, 467 P.2d 229, 85 Cal. Rptr. 629 (1970) (rejecting defendant's contention that obviousness
of peril precludes liability). See also Marschall, An Obvious Wrong Does Not Make a Right:
Manufacturers' Liability for Patently Dangerous Products, 48 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1065 (1973).
355. See discussion of warnings pp. 262-67 supra.
356. Thus, in Luque v. McLean, 8 Cal.3d 136, 501 P.2d 1163, 104 Cal. Rptr. 443 (1972),
the court reversed a judgment for defendant manufacturer of a lawn mower which had
mangled the plaintiff's hand when he slipped and accidently put his hand into the unguarded
blade. The trial court erroneously had required the plaintiff to show that he was unaware of
the dangerous condition. Testimony had indicated that the unguarded mower was very hazardous, that the risk of injury was foreseeable, and that the injury could have been prevented
by a simple and inexpensive safety device. And, in Bexiga v. Havir Mfg. Co., 60 N.J. 402,
290 A.2d 281 (1972), the court refused to relieve the manufacturer of liability for injury to
the plaintiff from a punch press which lacked a simple safety switch. As Professor Vetri has
noted, if the product is unreasonably dangerous as designed and marketed, then evidence of
the plaintiff's conduct in encountering those dangers should not be allowed as a defense
"because to do so, in effect, repudiates the very duty established for the manufacturer: . . .
[H)e should not be relieved of liability . . . when the lack of the safety device results in an
injury that a fulfillment of the duty would have prevented." Vetri, Products Liability: The
Prima Facie Case, supra note 218, at 1127.
357. See Kiely, supra note 9, at 932. Another area where courts have used concepts of
foreseeability to limit recovery is in those cases where the product caused injury to a by-
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Whereas only those risks which are remotely foreseeable or not foreseeable at all are excluded from liability under the negligence doctrine of foreseeability, the intended use doctrine limits liability to
those risks which are reasonably foreseeable under normal use of the
product. 358 The Illinois Supreme Court stated this view in Winnett
u. Winnett: 359
In our judgment the liability of a manufacturer properly encompasses only those individuals to whom injury from a defective
product may reasonably be foreseen and only those situations
where the product is being used for the purpose for which it was
intended or for which it is reasonably foreseeable that it may be
used. 360

Since publication of section 402A in 1965, courts have employed
the doctrine of intended use in this way to limit manufacturer liability.361 Some courts, however, in an attempt to broaden the scope of
liability without doing violence to the intended use doctrine, have
expanded it to include the notion of a foreseeable "use environment" for each product. They emphasize that where a product is
used is as important as how it is used in determining the spectrum
of risks that must be foreseen by the manufacturer. 362 Turcotte u.
Ford Motor Co. 363 exemplifies this effort:
stander. E.g., Winnett v. Winnett, 57 Ill.2d 7, 310N.E.2d1 (1974). The trend, however, seems
to be either to reject foreseeability as a limit to bystander recovery or at least to give it a
broader interpretation to permit bystander recovery. See Howes v. Hanson, 56 Wis.2d 247,
201 N.W.2d 825 (1972); Elmore v. American Motors Corp., 70 Cal.2d 578, 451 P.2d 84, 75
Cal. Rptr. 652 (1969). See also Noel, Defective Products: Extension of Strict Liability to
Bystanders, 38 TENN. L. R.Ev. 1 (1970); Note, Strict Products Liability to the Bystanders: A
Study in Common Law Determinism, 38 U. Cm. L. R.Ev. 625 (1971).
358. Kiely, supra note 9, at 932. See, e.g., Evans v. General Motors Corp., 359 F.2d 822
(7th Cir. 1966).
359. 57 Ill.2d 7, 310 N.E.2d 1 (1974).
360. Id. at 11, 310 N.E.2d at 4 (emphasis added).
361. See Kiely, supra note 9, at 933. Professor Kiely says the question has been debated
most rigorously in the "second collision" cases where plaintiffs have sought to hold automobile manufacturers liable for enhancement of injuries in collisions, even though the initial
collision was not caused by any defect in the product. The two conflicting lines of authority
emanate from Evans v. General Motors Corp., 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1966) (denying recovery), and Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968) (allowing recovery).
The Evans line of authority - limiting liability by relying on the concept of intended use may still constitute a bare majority; however, the definite trend since 1970 has been toward
the Larsen position. Judge Tamm of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals recently noted
that: "The modem trend of the case law and increasingly the weight of authority favors
Larsen's extended scope of liability." Knippen v. Ford Motor Co., 546 F.2d 993, 998 (D.C.Cir.
1976).
362. See, e.g., Turcotte v. Ford Motor Co., 494 F.2d 173 (1st Cir. 1974); Raymond v.
Riegel Textile Corp., 484 F.2d 1025 (1st Cir. 1973); Bremier v. Volkswagen of America, Inc.,
340 F. Supp. 949 (D. D.C. 1972); Dyson v. General Motors Corp., 298 F. Supp. 1064 (E.D.
Pa. 1969).
363. 494 F.2d 173 (1st Cir. 1974).
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A literal . . interpretation of "intended use" fails to recognize
that the phrase was first employed in ea~ly products-liability cases
such as Greenman . . . merely to illustrate the broader central
doctrine of foreseeability. The phrase was not meant to preclude
manufacturer responsibility for the probable ancillary consequences of normal use. . . . Instead, a manufacturer "must also
be expected to anticipate the environment which is normal for the
use of his product and . . . he must anticipate the reasonably
foreseeable risks of the use of his product in such an environment."384

The Montana Supreme Court in Brandenburger appears to
have adopted this more liberal view of foreseeability and intended
use, choosing to follow the growing majority position that an automobile manufacturer is liable for conditions which enhance injuries
on collision, even though the condition did not itself cause the collision, because collisions are predictable in the environment of intended use of the product: "[l]njuries are readily foreseeable as an
incident to the normal and expected use of the car. While automobiles are not made for the purpose of colliding with each other, a
frequent and inevitable contingency of normal automobile use will
result in collisions and injury-producing impacts." 365 Because this
view better implements the policy bases underlying strict liability,
the Montana bench and bar should retain this position and also
apply the broader concepts of foreseeability and environment of use
to products other than automobiles. 366
If injury results from use which was unforeseeable within the
use environment of the product, the product may be deemed not
unreasonably dangerous. 366 · 1 As Comment h of section 402A states:
"A product is not in a defective condition when it is safe for normal
handling and consumption." The foreseeability of the particular use
should be measured by an objective standard, not by the manufac364. Id. at 181.
365. Brandenburger v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 162 Mont. 506, 516, 513 P.2d
268, 274 (1973). The court also cited with approval the following language from Larsen v.
General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 502 (8th Cir. 1968): "No rational basis exists for limiting
recovery to situations where the defect in design or manufacture was a [sic] causative factor
of the accident, as the accident and the resulting injury, usually caused by the so-called
'second collision' of the passenger with the interior part of the automobile, all are foreseeable." Brandenburger v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 162 Mont. 506, 516, 513 P.2d 268,
274 (1973).
366. See, e.g., Raymond v. Riegel Textile Corp., 484 F.2d 1025 (1st Cir. 1973) (flammable children's wear); Spruill v. Boyle-Midway, Inc., 308 F.2d 79 (4th Cir. 1962) (excellent
refutation of intended use defense in a negligence case by manufacturer of poisonous furniture
polish ingested by infant); Brown v. Chapman, 304 F.2d 149 (9th Cir. 1962) (hula skirt ignited
while wearer danced near open fire).
366.1. Ford Motor Co. v. Matthews, 291 So.2d 169 (Miss. 1974). The court noted that
the foreseeability of misuse was a question for the jury. Accord, Moran v. Faberge, Inc., 273
Md. 538, 332 A.2d 11 (1975).
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turer's actual expectations. 387 Abnormal use which was not objectively foreseeable will not be an affirmative defense; instead, the
plaintiff simply will be unable to show the existence of an unreasonably dangerous defective condition in the product when marketed.
If the plaintiff does not follow warnings regarding hazards associated with the foreseeable uses of the product, the first questions a
court must answer are whether the warnings were adequate under
the circumstances and whether they would have reduced the risks
if they had been heeded. If not, then the manufacturer may be
responsible for injuries despite the warnings and despite the plaintiff's failure to follow them because the product was marketed in an
unreasonably dangerous condition. 388
If the warnings were clear, conspicious and objectively effective
in reducing the risks of use, then the manufacturer may attempt to
show that the plaintiff consciously disregarded the warnings and
therefore assumed the risk. 389 However, in such cases, it will be
easier for the manufacturer to simply prove the adequacy of the
warning, thereby making the plaintiff's conduct irrelevant. Whether
the plaintiff knowingly encountered the risk or carelessly failed to
follow the warnings, the result is the same; there was no "defect"
in the product. 370
D.

Tracing the Defect

Although part of the rationale for adoption of strict liability for
defective products was to enable injured plaintiffs to overcome the
difficulties of proving negligence, section 402A only imposes manufacturer liability if the product reached the consumer "without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold. " 371 The require367. See Simpson Timber Co. v. Parks, 369 F.2d 324 (9th Cir. 1966), vacated and
remanded, 388 U.S. 459 (1967), aff'g district court and remanding 390 F.2d 353, cert. denied,
393 U.S. 858 (1968).
368. See discussion of warnings pp. 262-67 supra.
369. But see discussion pp. 281-82 supra.
370. See generally Vetri, Products Liability: The Prima Facie Case, supra note 218, at
1126-27.
371. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 402A, (l)(b) (1965). Commentg says: "The rule
stated in this Section applies only where the product is, at the t.ime it leaves the seller's hands,
in a condition not contemplated by the ultimate consumer, which will be unreasonably
dangerous to him." There are several other pertinent comments which expand on this core
idea. Comment d provides that the rule of section 402A "extends to any product sold in the
condition, or substantially the same condition, in which it is expected to reach the ultimate
user or consumer." Comment g also provides that "the seller is not liable when he delivers
the product in a safe condition, and subsequent mishandling or other causes make it harmful
by the time it is consumed" and that "safe condition at the time of delivery by the seller
will, however, include proper packaging, necessary sterilization, and other precautions required to permit the product to remain safe for a normal length of time when handled in a
normal manner."
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ment that plaintiff trace the defect back into the hands of the defendant manufacturer is a substantial obstacle to recovery. Lapse of
time and long continued use will not prevent recovery where satisfactory proof of an original defect is made; 372 however, where no
direct evidence exists and proof must be by inference, the plaintiff's
continued use may preclude a finding that the product was defective
when it was sold. 373 Once the plaintiff has used the product for any
extended period of time it will be difficult for him to counteract the
argument that the seller does not undertake to provide a product
that will not wear out. 374
Even if the plaintiff can overcome the obstacle presented by
lapse of time and continued use, he still must eliminate the possibility that other causes, including his own improper conduct, were
responsible for the injury. Once plaintiff has accounted for his own
conduct and has eliminated all other reasonably probable causes, he
has established a strict liability claim against the dealer who sold
the product. To reach beyond the dealer to the manufacturer, 375 the
plaintiff then must show that the defect existed when it reached the
dealer. 376 In certain situations, courts in some jurisdictions have
372. Cf. Mickle v. Blackmon, 252 S.C. 202, 166 S.E.2d 173 (1969) (case brought on a
negligence cause of action but illustrative of the type of fact situation where long use did not
preclude recovery).
373. See Kerr v. Corning Glass Works, 284 Minn. 115, 169 N.W.2d 587 (1969).
374. See, e.g., Barich v. Ottenstror, __ Mont. __ , 550 P.2d 395, 398 (1976). But cf.
Mickle v. Blackmon, 252 S.C. 202, 166 S.E.2d 173 (1969). In Tucker v. Unit Crane & Shovel
Corp., 256 Ore. 318, 320, 473 P.2d 862 (1970), in which plaintiff's intestate was killed in 1965
by a crane manufactured in 1956, the court noted that "prolonged use of a manufactured
article is but one factor, albeit an important one, in the determination of whether a defect in
the product made it unsafe . . . . "Some of the nice questions that can arise here are reviewed
in Dunham v. Vaughan & Bushnell Mfg. Co., 42 Ill.2d 339, 247 N.E.2d 401, 403 (1969):
[The evidence in this case], including both the General Services Administration
specifications and tests and the testimony of the experts as to "work hardening"
or "metal failure," shows that hammers have a propensity to chip which increases
with continued use. From that evidence it would appear that a new hammer would
not be expected to chip, while at some point in its life the possibility of chipping
might become a reasonable expectation, and a part of the hammer's likely performance. The problems arise in the middle range, as Chief Justice Traynor has illustrated: "If an automobile part normally lasts five years, but the one in question
proves defective after six months of normal use, there would be enough deviation
to serve as a basis for holding the manufacturer liable for any resulting harm. What
if the part lasts four of the normal five years, however, and then proves defective?
For how long should a manufacturer be responsible for his product?"
375. Simply as a practical matter it is usually the initial manufacturer of the defective
product which will have the greatest financial capacity to provide reparation for plaintiff's
injuries.
376. Dean Prosser notes that: "When on the evidence it appears equally probable that
the defect has developed in the hands of the dealer, the plaintiff has not made out a case of
strict liability, or even negligence, against any prior party." He goes on to say, however, that:
"There need not be conclusive proof, and only enough is required to permit a finding of the
greater probability." W. PROSSER, supra note 3, § 103, at 674-75.
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attempted to ease plaintiff's burden by shifting responsibility for
tracing the defect to the manufacturer which seeks thereby to avoid
liability. 377
In Knudson v. Edgewater Automotive Division, 318 a case
brought in negligence, the Montana Supreme Court made some
telling comments about its perception of these questions. Although
saying that a manufacturer does not have a duty to furnish a product that will not wear out, 379 the court qualified that statement by
taking a rather expansive view of the length of time after sale a
manufacturer should be responsible for his product. The court found
the manufacturer liable even though four years had passed between
the date of manufacture and the injury and even though the product
had a life expectancy of only fifteen years: "The only testimony
concerning the condition at the time of the accident was by foreman
Morris, and he was definite in his opinion that the jack had not been
altered and the pin was broken and was the pin that was in the jack
when purchased." 380 The court's acceptance of this testimony, de·spite some conflicting testimony by the plaintiff, and its rejection
of defendant's presentation of evidence of alteration of the jack,
illustrates the court's rather liberal view of the plaintiff's satisfaction of its burden in this situation.
The court also takes a rather liberal view of what the plaintiff
must show to eliminate the possibility of other causes of the injury.
First, the court effectively shifted to the defendant the burden of
showing that the plaintiff's conduct was an equally probable cause
of the injury. The court declared that because there was no evidence
in the record to show any improper conduct by the plaintiff the trial
court was not in error when it rejected defendant's contentions regarding contributory negligence and assumption of risk. 381 Second,
the court allowed the plaintiff to reach beyond the dealer to recover
from the manufacturer simply on the basis of testimony by the
dealer that he sold the product in 1959 as new and that he had tested
the product then and found that the critical, defectively designed
component was in place. 382
In Barich v. Ottenstror, 383 the plaintiff did not recover because
she did not show that the defect existed in the hands of the defen377. Id. at 675-76 (citing, inter alia, Pulley v. Pacific Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 68
Wash.2d 778, 415 P.2d 636 (1966)).
378. 157 Mont. 400, 486 P.2d 596 (1971).
379. Id. at 414-15, 486 P.2d at 604. The court cited with apparent approval an instruction given by the trial court to that effect.
380. Id. at 411, 486 P.2d at 602.
381. Id. at 412-13, 486 P.2d at 603.
382. Id. at 411, 486 P.2d at 602.
383. _Mont._, 550 P.2d 395 (1976).
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dant. The plaintiff sought to recover for injuries suffered when she
fell and broke her wrist while attempting to lift a cardboard wardrobe which ripped. The wardrobe had carried clothing from Anaconda, Montana, to Pennsylvania, had remained in an unheated
"garage for the next two years subjected to the vicissitude of temperature and humidity typical to Pennsylvania," and then had returned in a rented truck to Anaconda. 384 Addressing section 402A's
requirement of tracing the defect in the context of a Rule 56 motion
for summary judgment, the court decided that the defendant had
met its burden under Rule 56 by submitting evidence of the plaintiff's use of the product for a considerable length of time after sale.
The court followed decisions in other jurisdictions in holding that
long use creates an inference that "the defective condition could not
have existed at the time the product was sold." To resist the Rule
56 motion, it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to overcome those
inferences in order to show that genuine issues of material fact existed for trial. 385
Courts should not allow defense counsel to use the tracing requirement to erect unreasonable barriers to plaintiffs' recovery. To
do so would undercut the clear policy foundations underlying strict
liability. The philosophies implicitly expressed in Knudson, where
the court did not require the plaintiff to present direct and persuasive proof tracing the defect to the manufacturer and did allow a
reasonable passage of time without creating an inference favorable
to the manufacturer, should be reinforced and continued.

E.

Causation

Section 402A provides that "one who sells ~my product in a
defective condition unreasonably dangerous . . . is subject to liabil384. Id. at 397. The court considered photographs and testimony regarding the condi·
tion of the wardrobe:
After over two years of continued use for both storage and moving, the carton,
although clearly still usable, showed the obvious signs of normal wear and tear. A
puncture hole exists on the same side used by appellant when the accident oc·
curred, and a huge tear in the cardboard appears near the base of the carton. The
box is necessarily reinforced by masking tape in several critical areas. Appellant
was unable to recount any specific facts which might tend to explain the deterioration of the carton's condition. Id.
385. Id. at 398. Because the case came before the court on appeal of a motion for summary
judgment, the opinion has limited application to the overall question of the respective burdens of plaintiffs and defendants in tracing the defect. Nonetheless, the holding that evidence of Jong use creates an inference that the defect did not exist in the hands of the
manufacturer seems to be a retreat from the holding in Knudson. However, the difference
may lie in the nature of the products at issue. The jack in Knudson was expected to be used
heavily for fifteen years, whereas the cardboard product in Barich probably was approaching
the end of its expectable useful life at the time the accident occurred.
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ity for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer . . . . "Thus, section 402A clearly requires that the sale of the
product substantially contribute to the consumer's injury; the more
difficult problem is to define the precise nature of that requirement.
Courts traditionally use proximate cause-"producing cause, legal
cause, causa causans" 386-in negligence cases when limiting liability
as a matter of social policy, and some courts apply legal cause to
strict liability cases. 387 However, "[T]hese purely legal concepts
present a false causation issue," "whether . . . the seller's placing
the product in the stream of trade did contribute substantially to
the consumer's injul) in making use of the product is . . . the only
legitimate cause issue." 388
1

F.

Defendants Other Than Principal Manufacturers

Section 402A provides:
(1) "One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous . . . is subject to liability for physical harm
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer . . . if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a
product . . . (emphasis added).

Comment a states that "this Section states a special rule applicable
to sellers of products," and Comment c provides the justification for
imposing strict liability on the seller. 389 Comment f further defines
386. Green, supra note 53, at 1198.
387. The concept of foreseeability has been incorporated into proximate cause as a limitation on liability in a negligence case. If the injury was an unforeseeable result of defendant's
activity, then there is no negligence. E.g., Stephens v. Mutual Lumber Co., 103 Wash. 1, 173
P. 1031 (1918). In a strict liability case the foreseeability concepts incorporated in legal or
proximate cause which are used to limit liability are unnecessary because analogous limits
are already present in the doctrines of abnormal use. See discussion pp. 282-85 supra.
388. Green, supra note 53, at 1198-99. See also Vetri, Products Liability: The Prima Facie
Case, supra note 218, at 1125. Professor Vetri says that: "Plaintiff carries the burden of proof
to show that the harm is factually related to the defective condition of the product . . . . "
(emphasis added). But he also says: "Ifit can be shown that the product likely failed because
of a defective condition and contributed to plaintiff's harm, the jury will be allowed to infer
the causal connection." Id.
Dean Green also noted that "it is remarkable how many false issues of causal connection
are raised and sometimes employed to defeat a plaintiff's case when the seller has violated
its duty to give an adequate warning of the dangerousness of its product or adequate directions for its use." Examples given are a seller's contentions that the "consumer would not
have heeded a warning or read the directions" or "would have disregarded the danger." Dean
Green repudiates such false issues in the following terms: "If the consumer has in fact made
use of the product for the purpose intended, what might have happened had the seller performed his duty to warn or direct is only a red herring designed to divert the Court from the
basic issue." Green, supra note 53, at 1199-1200. See Technical Chem. Co. v. Jacobs, 480
S.W.2d 602 (Tex. 1972).
389. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment c (1965). The Comment says:
On whatever theory, the justification for the strict liability has been said to be that
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what is meant by the phrase "business of selling":
The rule stated in this Section applies to any person engaged
in the business of selling products for use or consumption. It therefore applies to any manufacturer of such a product, to any wholesale or retail dealer or distributor, and to the operator of a restaurant. It is not necessary that the seller be engaged solely in the
business of selling such products. . . .
The rule does not, however, apply to the occasional seller of
food or other such products who is not engaged in that activity as
a part of his business. . . . The basis for the rule is the ancient
one of the special responsibility for the safety of the public undertaken by one who enters into the business of supplying human
beings with products which may endanger the safety of their persons and property, and the forced reliance upon that undertaking
on the part of those who purchase such goods. 390

Since adoption of section 402A in 1965, courts have focused on
which defendants are and should be included in the definition of
being "in the business of selling a product." Courts in most jurisdictions initially limited strict liability in tort to those specifically
enumerated in Comment f of section 402A - manufacturers, retailers, wholesalers and distributors. 391 One commentator has suggested
that courts are now evincing "increased willingness . . . to expand
the application of the concept of 'seller' to additional parties in the
the seller, by marketing his product for use and consumption, has undertaken and
assumed a special responsibility toward any member of the consuming public who may
be injured by it; that the public has the right to and does expect, in the case of products
which it needs and for which it is forced to rely upon the seller, that reputable sellers
will stand behind their goods; that public policy demands that the burden of accidental injuries caused by products intended for consumption be placed upon those who
market them, and be treated as a cost of production against which liability insurance
can be obtained; and that the consumer of such products is entitled to the maximum
of protection at the hands of someone, and the proper persons to afford it are those
who market the products.
390. A good discussion of occasional sellers is found in Samson v. Riesing, 62 Wis.2d 698,
215 N.W.2d 662 (1974), but the cause of action there was for breach of warranty and negligence.
391. See, e.g., Dunham v. Vaughan & Bushnell Mfg. Co., 42 Ill.2d 339, 247 N.E.2d 401
(1969); Housman v. C. A. Dawson & Co., 106 Ill. App.2d 225, 245 N.E.2d 886 (1969); Barth
v. B. F. Goodrich Tire Co., 265 Cal. App.2d 228, 71 Cal. Rptr. 306 (1968); Read v. Safeway
Stores, Inc., 264 Cal. App.2d 404, 70 Cal. Rptr. 454 (1968).
The drafters of the Restatement expressed no opinion on imposing liability on sellers of
component parts, but, instead included a caveat that says that strict liability may not apply
"to the seller of a component part of a product to be assembled." In Comment q the drafters
explained that there had not been enough cases by then to justify adopting a rule on the issue.
The Comment does say, however, that "where there is no change in the component part itself,
but it is merely incorporated into something larger, the strict liability will be found to carry
through to the ultimate user or consumer." A number of courts have followed this approach
to impose liability. See, e.g., City of Franklin v. Badger Ford Truck Sales, Inc., 58 Wis.2d
641, 207 N.W.2d 866 (1973) (expressly relying on language of Comment q).
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American business scene," 392 but this effort to expand imposition of
strict liability has proceeded slowly and in most instances has been
grounded primarily on warranty theories.

1.

Other Suppliers

As to lessors and bailors of products, strict liability first invaded the field of bailments for hire when courts found a warranty
of fitness and safety to the immediate bailee; 393 the right to recover
was extended to third parties not in privity in Cintrone v. Hertz
Truck Leasing & Rental Service. 394 Today, commercial lessors are
subject to strict liability in many states. 395
Sellers of used products have been held liable under both negligence and strict liability theories for selling unsafe products, 396 but
strict liability probably will continue to have more limited applicability. 397

2.

Real Property

The imposition of liability in negligence upon builders and contractors has tended generally to follow that for manufacturers and
392. Kiely, supra note 9, at 927-28. See, e.g., Newmark v. Gimbel's, Inc., 54 N.J. 585,
258 A.2d 697 (1969) (beauty shop for hair care products); Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing &
Rental Service, 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769 (1965) (lessors); Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc.,
44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965) (mass producer of homes).
393. See, e.g., Electrical Advertising Inc. v. Sakato, 94 Ariz. 68, 381 P.2d 755 (1963).
394. 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769 (1965). See also Fulbright v. Klamath Gas Co., 271 Ore.
449, 533 P.2d 316 (1975).
395. Stewart v. Budget Rent-A-Car Corp., 52 Haw. 71, 470 P.2d 240 (1970); Bachner v.
Pearson, 479 P.2d 319 (Alas. 1970). Although courts emphasize that defendant must be in
the business of leasing, it need not be its primary business. Price v. Shell Oil Co., 2 Cal.3d
245, 466 P.2d 722, 85 Cal. Rptr. 178 (1970). In Cintrone, the New Jersey Supreme Court found
that many of the same policy reasons underlying strict liability for manufacturers and sellers
applied equally well to commercial lessors. The products leased are often equally hazardous,
the lessee similarly often has less bargaining power than the lessor and must rely on the lessor,
and the lessor usually is in a better position to prevent the risks and to spread the risk of
loss. Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Service, 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769, 776-81
(1965). See also Lovely v. Burroughs Corp., 165 Mont. 209, 527 P.2d 557 (1974) (liability
imposed on lessor for economic loss, based upon R.C.M. 1947, § 42-211).
396. See, e.g., Gaidry Motors, Inc. v. Brannon, 268 S.W.2d 627 (Ky. 1953) (negligence);
Realmuto v. Straub Motors, Inc., 65 N.J. 336, 322 A.2d 440 (1974) (strict liability); Turner
v. International Harvester Co., 133 N.J. Super. 277, 336 A.2d 62 (1975). See generally Note,
Turner v. International Harvester Company: Strictly Speaking, Can Section 402A Be Extended To Hold Used Car Dealers Liable In Tort? 21 S. D. L. REv. 468 (1976).
397. See Peterson v. Lou Bachrodt Chevrolet, Co., 61 Ill.2d 17, 329 N.E.2d 785 (1975);
Rix v. Reeves, 23 Ariz. App. 243, 532 P.2d 185 (1975). A number of courts have, however,
extended the scope of section 402A to permit recovery for unsafe products sold by many
persons who might not otherwise be considered "suppliers." See Foster v. Day & Zimmerman, Inc., 502 F.2d 867 (8th Cir. 1974) (manufacturer of grenades on a government contract);
Link v. Sun Oil Co., __ Ind. App. __ , 312 N.E.2d 126 (1974) (service station owner for
installing new tube in tire which exploded); Worrell v. Barnes, 87 Nev. 204, 484 P.2d 573
(1971).
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suppliers of products. 398 Today, the rule of liability in negligence
without privity is almost universally accepted and applied to the
contractor so that he is "liable to all those who may foreseeably be
injured by the structure, not only when he fails to disclose dangerous
conditions known to him, but also when the work is negligently
done.'' 399
Since the early 1960's, courts have imposed strict liability
under a theory of implied warranty of habitability which runs from
the builder or seller of a newly built structure to the immediate
buyer. 400 In 1965 this warranty was extended to a third-party occupant in a New Jersey case. 401 This case has since been followed by a
small number of other jurisdictions, 402 and it should become the
prevailing rule. 403 While most courts which have found contractors
strictly liable have relied on warranty theories, a rather recent Nevada case404 imposed strict liability in tort on a home repair contractor for installation of a residential gas system which leaked and
resulted in fire damage. 405

3.

Endorsers

In negligence cases, a person who sells as his own a product
which was manufactured by another, assumes the responsibility of
the manufacturer. 406 Recently, courts also have imposed strict liability in this situation. 407 When an endorser, such as a testing laboratory, specifically certifies that a product is safe, negligence liability
also may be imposed. 408
398. W. PROSSER, supra note 3, § 104, at 680.
399. Id. at 681. The rule applies to those who do the original work, supervising architects
and engineers, and those who make repairs in, or install parts of, the structure.
400. See, e.g., Cochran v. Keeton, 287 Ala. 439, 252 So.2d 313 (1971); Carpenter v. Donohoe, 154 Colo. 78, 388 P.2d 399 (1964). In these cases, the resultant injury was to the property
of the plaintiff, not to his person.
401. Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965).
402. See, e.g., Hyman v. Gordon, 35 Cal. App.3d 769, 111 Cal. Rptr. 262 (1973); Kriegler
v. Eichler Homes, Inc., 269 Cal. App.2d 224, 74 Cal. Rptr. 749 (1969); State Stove Mfg. Co.
v. Hodges, 189 So.2d 113 (Miss. 1966). See generally Bethlahmy v. Bechtel, 91 Idaho 55, 415
P.2d 698 (1966) (dicta).
403. See W. PROSSER, supra note 3, § 104, at 682. But see Barnes v. MacBrown & Co.,
_Ind. App._, 323 N.E.2d 671 (1975); Wright v. Creative Corp., 30 Colo. App. 575, 498
P.2d 1179 (1972).
404. Worrell v. Barnes, 87 Nev. 204, 484 P.2d 573 (1971).
405. Id. at 208-09, 484 P.2d at 576.
406. Initially courts imposed liability on the theory that defendant was estopped from
denying that it had manufactured the product, but today courts reaso~ that the defendant
has vouched for the product. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 400, e.g., Carney v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 309 F.2d 300 (4th Cir. 1962); Penn v. Inferno Mfg. Co., 199 So. 2d 210
(La. App. 1967); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Morris, 273 Ala. 218, 136 So. 2d 883 (1961).
407. See Schwartz v. Macrose Lumber & Trim Co., 50 Misc.2d 547, 270 N.Y.S.2d 875
(Sup. Ct. 1966).
408. Hempstead v. General Fire Extinguisher Corp., 269 F. Supp. 109 (D. Del. 1967).
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Services

While it is clear that "one who renders services to another is
under a duty to exercise reasonable care in doing so, and that he is
liable for any negligence to anyone who may foreseeably be expected
to be injured as a result," 409 efforts to extend strict liability to services have been relatively unsuccessful. 410 There are, however, courts
which have found strict liability on either a warranty or tort basis.
In Worrell v. Barnes, 411 a home repair contractor was held strictly
liable in tort for "supplying" defective gas pipe fittings; in
Newmark v. Gimbel's Inc., 412 a beauty parlor was held strictly liable
on a warranty theory for applying the offending product to plaintiff's hair; 413 and in Buckeye Union Fire Insurance Co. v. Detroit
Edison Co., 414 a seller of electricity was held liable on an implied
warranty theory for a fire that burned plaintiff's home. 415 While it
is difficult to predict the extent to which strict liability in either tort
or warranty will be applied to service transactions, it may play a
more significant role in the future. 418
CONCLUSION: JUDGE AND JURY

In concluding, the respective roles of judge and jury in a strict
liability case require comment. In a traditional negligence case, the
jury plays the critical role in deciding whether the defendant negliSometimes, the court will find liability based on negligent misrepresentation. See Hanberry
v. Hearst Corp., 276 Cal. App.2d 680, 81 Cal. Rptr. 519 (1969). One California court has even
stated that recent commentary might warrant reevaluation of the rationale of Hanberry with
the implication that strict liability might be imposed. Kasel v. Remington Arms Co., 24 Cal.
App.3d 711, 726-27, 101 Cal. Rptr. 314, 324 (1972). But more courts deny liability. Yuhas v.
Mudge, 129 N.J. Super. 207, 322 A.2d 824 (1974); MacKown v. Illinois Publishing & Printing
Co., 289 Ill. App. 59, 6 N.E.2d 526 (1937).
409. W. PROSSER, supra note 3, § 104, at 679.
410. Hoffman v. Simplot Aviation, Inc., 97 Idaho 32, 539 P.2d 584 (1975); LaRossa v.
Scientific Design Co., 402 F.2d 937 (3rd Cir. 1968). Courts often have declined to apply strict
liability even when a product has been supplied in the course of the service. Wagner v.
Coronet Hotel, 10 Ariz. App. 296, 458 P.2d 390 (1969). This seems to be especially true where
defendant is a "professional." Magrine v. Spector, 100 N. J. Super. 223, 241A.2d637 (1968);
Silverhart v. Mount Zion Hosp., 20 Cal. App.3d 1022, 98 Cal. Rptr. 187 (1971).
411. 87 Nev. 204, 484 P.2d 573 (1971).
412. 54 N.J. 585, 258 A.2d 697 (1969).
413. The court said the transaction was a "hybrid partaking of incidents of a sale and a
service." Id. at 701.
414. 38 Mich. App. 325, 196 N.W.2d 316 (1972).
415. The court said that it saw "no reason why the concepts of implied warranty should
depend upon a distinction between the sale of a good and the sale of a service." 196 N.W.2d
at 318.
416. But cf. Hoover v. Montogomery Ward & Co., 270 Ore. 498, 528 P.2d 76 (1974) (court
rejected strict liability for defective installation of non-defective component part and expressly distinguished Newmark and Worrell, saying that those cases dealt with services in
which a defective product was used).
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gently caused damage to the plaintiff. The decisional role of the
judge is limited unless he determines that the jury could not reasonably find for the plaintiff, in which case he will direct a verdict for
the defendant. 07
In contrast, in a strict liability case, judges play a larger role
in deciding the threshold question of whether strict liability should
even apply to the type of product or type of seller at issue. Section
402A imposes upon manufacturers a strict liability legal obligation
to refrain from.placing a product in the stream of trade in an unreasonably dangerous defective condition. 418 The trial judge must determine whether the particular defendant is subject to that strict
liability legal obligation to protect the plaintiff against harm before
he allows the case to go to the jury. 419 To make that determination,
the trial judge first must consider whether the various policy factors, 420 such as spreading the risk of loss and deterrence, which support the imposition of that legal obligation apply, 421 and then he
must consider whether the risk of injury for which the plaintiff
claims the right to recover falls within the scope of that obligation. 422
If the judge decides that it would not be unreasonable for the jury
to find for the plaintiff, he then may properly submit the issues to
them. 423 Dean Green notes that in practice when the trial judge has
any doubts about these issues he frequently will resolve them in
favor of submitting the issues to the jury. 424
The jury then must decide whether the manufacturer or seller
417. See Wade, supra note 181, at 838.
418. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965); Green, supra note 53, at 1200.
419. See Wade, supra note 181, at 838; Vetri, Product Liability: The Developing Framework for Analysis, supra note 218, at 303-04.
420. See, e.g., Brandenburger v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 162 Mont. 506, 51415, 513 P.2d 268, 273 (1973); Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal.2d 57, 377 P.2d
897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962). See generally discussion pp. 247-48 supra.
421. See Vetri, Products Liability: The Prima Facie Case, supra note 218, at 1119. Cf.
Wade, supra note 181, at 838.
422. Green, supra note 53, at 1200-01. Professor Vetri enumerates some of these scope of
duty issues as follows:
Other issues, such as whether retailers should be held strictly liable, whether strict
liability protection extends to bystanders, the type of damages to be compensated,
the inclusion or exclusion of developmental risks within the scope of protection and
the extension of strict liability to other types of transactions are all resolved under
the duty element.
Vetri, Products Liability: The Prima Facie Case, supra note 218, at 1119.
423. Wade, supra note 181, at 839 (citing, Dunham v. Vaughan & Bushnell Mfg. Co., 42
Ill.2d 339, 247 N.E.2d 401 (1969)). In Dunham, the plaintiff lost his sight in one eye when a
metal chip from a top grade quality hammer broke off and went into his eye. Experts testified
that they could not find any flaws in the forging of the hammer. Nonetheless, the Illinois
Supreme Court upheld the trial court's submission of the case to the jury. The court said that
products were defective if they endangered users and that evaluation of that dangerousness
was properly a factual determination for the jury to make. 247 N.E.2d at 403.
424. Green, supra note 53, at 1202.
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has violated his legal obligation, or duty, by considering the evidence presented by both parties to determine whether the condition
of the product unreasonably endangered the plaintiff. This evaluation necessarily entails a risk-utility balancing analysis. 425 Dean
Wade argues that the factors he has proposed for making this riskutility analysis' 26 should not be submitted to the jury; he implies
that those factors are only helpful to judges, students and commentators. 427 He would prefer, instead, to instruct the jury to consider
whether "a reasonable prudent manufacturer [supplier], who had
actual knowledge of its harmful character," would have placed the
product on the market. 428
This approach seems to return to negligence notions of reasonable prudence and an objective standard of conduct and fails to fully
and properly inform the jury of the nature of its decisionmaking
process. As Dean Green notes, both the "reasonable seller with actual knowledge" standard of Dean Wade 429 and the reasonable expectations of the ordinary consumer standard of the Restatement'30
ring of negligence and are unnecessary attempts to impose an external objective standard for juries to use in evaluating the conduct
of the manufacturer. 431 Juries should be trusted to make their own
determination whether the manufacturer violated his duty to refrain from placing a hazardous product on the market. To make this
determination, they should know what factors bear upon their evaluation of the product which the manufacturer placed on the market.
Professor Vetri correctly advocates informing the jury of the nature
of its decision by instructing them to "balance the probability and
gravity of harm against the utility of the alleged defective condition
by considering the manufacturer's ability to eliminate such condition at a reasonable cost without impairing the utility of the product."432
With the respective roles of judge and jury in mind, the bench
and bar in Montana can seize the opportunity to build a products
425. See generally discussion pp. 257, 259-61, 263-65, 67-70 supra.
426. See text and accompanying footnotes pp. 268-69 supra.
427. Wade, supra note 181, at 840.
428. Id. at 840.
429. Id. at 834-35, 839-40. See generally Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Ore. 485,
491-94, 525 P.2d 1033, 1036-37 (1974). Cf. Keeton, supra note 216, at 404, 408 (proposing a
similar imputation to the seller of knowledge of the dangerous condition).
430. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) or TORTS § 402A, Comment g at 352 (1965). See, e.g., Kirkland v. General Motors Corp., 521 P.2d 1353, 1362-63 (Okla. 1974).
431. Green, supra note 53, at 1204-06.
432. Vetri, Products Liability: The Developing Framework for Analysis, supra note 218,
at 304. He would thus describe to the jury the factors which would go into this balancing,
including presumably either the factors he. or Wade has enumerated. See pp. 268-69 & note
296 supra.
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liability jurisprudence which is clear and fair. Being ever alert to the
pitfalls encountered in other jurisdictions with this new field of
strict liability, courts and counsel should seek to implement the
policies underlying adoption of section 402A of the Restatement
without being hindered by the technical language of that section.

